THE ARYAN PATH

Point out the "Way" — however dimly, and lost among the host — as does the evening star to those who tread their path in darkness.
—The Voice of the Silence

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A PILGRIMAGE OF EFFORT

" . . . Yes, if one might save!
And means must be! There must be refuge! Men
Perished in winter-winds till one smote fire
From flint-stones coldly hiding what they held,
The red spark treasured from the kindling sun.
They gorged on flesh like wolves, till one sowed corn,
Which grew a weed, yet makes the life of man;
They mowed and babbled till some tongue struck speech,
And patient fingers framed the lettered sound.
What good gift have my brothers, but it came
From search and strife and loving sacrifice? . . . "

— Prince Siddhartha in *The Light of Asia*

Try to realize that progress is made step by step, and each step gained by *heroic* effort. Withdrawal means despair or timidity . . . . Conquered passions, like slain tigers, can no longer turn and rend you. Be hopeful then, not despairing. With *each* morning's awakening try to live through the day in harmony with the Higher Self. "Try" is the battle-cry taught by the teacher to each pupil. Naught else is *expected* of you. One who does *his best does all that can be asked.*

—H. P. BLAVATSKY

"THE LILIES OF THE FIELD . . . toil not, neither do they spin; and yet . . . Solomon in all his glory was not arrayed like one of these." But while this is true for all beings below man, it is not applicable to the human Soul. Man, if he would be arrayed in a robe of glory, must weave it with his own exertion. The law of growth is a universal one, but while it embraces all beings from the atom to Brahma, there is a fundamental difference between its operation in the kingdoms of Nature below the self-conscious stage represented by man and in reference to human evolution.

The law of growth in the lower kingdoms is that of natural impulse. Given the right conditions the seed develops into the plant by natural impulse. There is no need to plan, or to choose. Nature herself takes care of the whole process stage by stage. While natural impulse still operates in the human kingdom, in the growth of the human body, for instance, the Soul's own progress is dependent on its own determination and its own effort. Its mission is work. From this basic principle flow certain most important applications.

If to live means for man to exert himself and to labour, a life of ease may be a disadvantage. The Soul in its normal state should enjoy such conditions as call for effort and for hard work. It is only the personal or lower self that desires physical ease and comfort.

Life, is after all, the great Teacher and it provides the hardship and the trials necessary to call forth individual effort. That most people are compelled to earn their own livelihood with their work is a salutary thing. Few there are who without that compulsion are resourceful and strong enough to devise ways and means to keep active and busy along constructive lines. This is illustrated by the tragedy of the son of wealthy parents who is relieved of the responsibility of earning for himself. If not strong enough morally and mentally he may drift into a life of slothful ease, with no real incentive or purpose. It is natural and spontaneous to want to strive and to meet all experiences as so many challenges. The opportunity to lead an idle and a frivolous life is a curse, and not a blessing as some who are ignorant may fancy.

Watch a normal child at play. It is fascinating to note how he enjoys meeting challenge after challenge. Faced with a difficulty he tries and tries until he is able to overcome it. If a game of skill has become too easy it ceases to interest him and he is ready for one more difficult. The process of learning requires these obstacles just as the development of physical muscle requires exercise. Unused, our limbs would weaken and become atrophied.

The same principle extends to the sphere of psychology and we would neither grow nor progress in an environment free of all difficulties and offering no problems and, therefore, no challenges.

Down the ages have the Great Teachers pointed out the Way and asked man to walk it through his own self-effort. Their battle-cry to us all is "Try, try, ever keep trying." We need faith and persistency, mental effort and constant practice. Too many mark time or allow discouragement to set in, forgetting that there is no failure except ceasing to try. Too many procrastinate, awaiting—as they fancy—more favourable condi-

tions. If we never begin, we will never accomplish.

Let us begin at once and sustain our courage by taking joy in the effort itself.

Begin with small things and watch the results. Your faith will increase. Have you ever watched a habit grow? Children sometimes are taught a most practical game. They are asked to draw, say, a dozen five-pointed stars and then, placing each sheet in front of the mirror, try to trace each drawing by following the reflection of the star in the mirror. The hand fumbles and hesitates and moves ever so slowly! But with each fresh attempt the tracing becomes more accurate and quicker and finally it is perfect. The child has learnt directly the truth of the saying "practice makes perfect." Applied to habits of thought and of feeling the same principle will enable us to form good habits. We have but to try to work in and on ourselves with patience and perseverance to find out that this is a true principle of human growth and hence that it does work!

We are here to obtain the exercise necessary for the development of moral muscle and mental strength. Let us learn to welcome every opportunity to discipline ourselves. Difficulties and trials, if correctly understood and rightly met, result in strength, fortitude and sympathy.

With a patient heart and cheerful disposition we must

> follow the wheel of life; follow the wheel of duty to race and kin, to friend and foe, and close thy mind to pleasures as to pain. Exhaust the law of Karmic retribution. Gain Siddhis for thy future birth.

These *Siddhis* are the powers of the Spirit. They will open up for us greater and greater opportunities for self-sacrificing service. Such gifts and powers are to be placed upon the altar of human brotherhood. They must be deserved through hard work and constant effort. Lord Buddha gives four steps as the means of attaining the vision of the great Self and the strength to renounce the little self. They are: the will to acquire such power; the necessary exertion; the indispensable preparation of the heart; and a diligent investigation of the Truth.

May we begin in earnest to lead the life necessary for the acquisition of Wisdom!

NAMRATĀ

THE MYSTICAL ELEMENT IN SHELLEY'S POETRY

[THIS is the second and concluding part of an illuminating article by **Dr. I. A. Richards**. An eminent figure in the study of English literary criticism and language and the author of several books, our esteemed contributor describes here Shelley's mysticism as an apprehension of "the influence which is moved not but moves" and draws a most interesting parallel with the symbols of Cave and Temple in Eastern mysticism.—ED.]

II

THE ACTION OF *Prometheus Unbound* is singular, I believe, in being essentially completed at the fifty-third line of the play. The remainder is outcome and reverberation from Prometheus's moral triumph there recorded. This, of course, entailed a prodigious task of invention and design upon the author, but did not find him short of resources. The hardest part of his task, perhaps, was to find something for Prometheus himself and his circle to do after his triumph.

His greeting to Asia when he is unbound can tell us much and prepare us to read what follows with a more discerning eye:—

> Asia, thou light of life,
> Shadow of beauty unbeheld.[1]

We should be remembering as we read that it is the transfigured Asia he is saluting: the "Child of Light," the "Lamp of Earth," the Presence the Voice in the Air has been describing. It is this which is still "Shadow of beauty unbeheld." Even beyond and beyond beyond....It is this, I suggest, that is the most characteristic note of Shelley's mysticism: all lights are but tokens, veils, shadows, "vanishing apparitions which haunt the interlunations of life," as he says in *The Defence of Poetry*, where poets too and their words are "hierophants of an *unapprehended* inspiration,"

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[1] I cannot agree with Mr. Rogers that "Shadow has been displaced by *light*. No longer is Asia 'unbeheld' since she has been unveiled." (*Shelley at Work*, p. 130) This, it seems to me, would be a sad confusion of the visible and the indivisible of a kind which Shelley's knowledge of *Phaedrus* 249C, for example, would make very improbable :—

"...and this is a recollection of those things which our soul once beheld, when it journeyed with God and, lifting its vision above the things which we now say exist, rose up into real being. And therefore it is just that the mind of the philosopher only has wings, for he is always, so far as he is able, in communion through memory with those things the communion with which causes God to be divine." (*Phaedrus* 249C)

"words which express *what they understand not*" (italics mine). Even Asia here is such a word and so too is the Cave on which Prometheus now lavishes description which a dull reading will easily find as strained and artificial as Dante's topazes. But

> a fountain
> Leaps in the midst with an awakening sound.

This Cave—with the account the Earth gives later of how to reach it:

> And beyond Indus and its tribute rivers....
> And up the green ravine, across the vale,
> Beside the windless and crystalline pool—

has made many think of the Cave of Amarnath. That too is a goal of pilgrimages which enact, no doubt, as Prometheus's Cave does, a beyond....

The danger, as ever, is in literalism, idolatry. Prometheus and his Oceanides are immortals and *either* eternal (and therefore unimaginable) *or* mere perpetuals, everlastings, objects with an unbounded durability (and therefore insipid). Homer himself suffered pre-eminently from this difficulty. Not even the greatest poets know what to do with unlimited free time. The Olympians are almost extinguished with boredom: their only resources are feasts, eroticism and quarreling. As soon as Prometheus is released Shelley faces this insoluble problem and faces it very frankly and courageously.

He struggles with it for about twenty lines (III, iii, 22–39). The moment this Cave has turned into

> A simple dwelling, which shall be our own,

—an ideal perfectly fitted to harassed mortals—the question: "What on earth are immortals to do there?" is upon him. He tries a remote diluted echo or two from *King Lear* (V, iii, 8–20). But Prometheus and his companions are not "birds i' the cage." In immediate conjunction with "As the world ebbs and flows" the fatal words "ourselves unchanged" are uttered. With all that we know of his history around him Lear can say

> we'll wear out
> In a wall'd prison, packs and sects of great ones
> That ebb and flow by the moon

but Prometheus's victory has cost him his qualification. And his further efforts only lead into a shallower welter of triviality.[2] He recognizes this

[2] It is unfair to put Shelley—not at his best—between Shakespeare and Dante; but lines 26–36 may be compared with *Paradiso*, XXX, 13–33. He redeems this failure in what follows.

in the brave words "Our unexhausted spirits," but the game is up. Only one activity can truly kill time; and that is Poetry itself and the other Arts: creative activity. Prometheus turns then to the exploration of the mystery of the service of imagination to man. That is what this Cave is for :—

Such virtue has the cave and place around.

The exploration of imagination and its reference to Reality does not necessarily, or ordinarily, lead to mysticism. With Shelley it did. His own experience of inspiration was decisive for him. His descriptions in prose and in verse make this very clear. *The Defence of Poetry* is the most sustained of these affirmations and the best known. I will quote from only one sentence: "Poetry...expresses those arrangements of language... which are created by that imperial faculty, whose throne is curtained within the invisible nature of man." To explore the reach of this we may add, from his *Essay on Christianity* :—

> Our most imperial and stupendous faculties—those on which the majesty and the power of humanity is erected—are, relatively to the inferior portion of its mechanism, active and imperial; but they are the passive slaves of some higher and more omnipotent Power.

And from the same :—

> We live and move and think; but we are not the creators of our own origin and existence. . .we are not the masters of our own imaginations and moods of mental being. There is a Power by which we are surrounded, like the atmosphere in which some motionless lyre is suspended, which visits with its breath our silent chords at will.

The passage in Act III, Scene iii, which has been under examination, moves, it will be noted, on from "Our unexhausted spirits" to the study of creation *via* the image of an Æolean Lute or Lyre. This may have come to him from Coleridge: from *The Æolean Harp* or *Dejection: an Ode*. In any case he made great use of it: in Stanza V of the *Ode to the West Wind* for example. Here it is the prelude to a wide survey of influences by which the creative mind can be touched. The passage is one of the most complex even in Shelley and a gloss may be helpful:

Upon the liberated mind converge the "echoes," or reflections, of all its voices—the whisper of love, the murmur of pity, and Music (itself doubly an echo[3] and all that "tempers and improves"; and come to us further, the ever-living offspring of the other arts: Painting, Sculpture,

[3] As Robert Bridges pointed out, this is from *Twelfth Night*, II, iv, 21: "It gives a very echo to the seat where Love is thron'd." (*The Spirit of Man*, Note to Fourth Impression)

inspired Poetry and unknown arts of the future (the Cinema?). These offspring are epiphanies, divine visitations, which grow brighter as (in the measure in which) the mind—exalted and illumined from the "embrace" of Intellectual Beauty (the idea of the Good, the One, the Unconditioned, the Indivisible, the Source Itself of the Forms, the Intelligible World, of which these messengers themselves are derived appearances)—reflects upon them the "gathered rays," the Recollected, re-concentrated light which makes them what they are: the wandering voices and the shadows ("shadow of Beauty unbeheld") of "all that man becomes": of all that is fitting to him and of that greatness into which he will unfold; which voices (echoes) and shadows are the "mediators," in the theological sense, and the daemons (see *Symposium* 202, E), as well as means, of "that best worship, love," reciprocal between Man and "us"; *i.e.*, that which, in "the gathered rays," Prometheus and Asia would represent; these "swift" (fleeting? transient?) phantoms and echoes grow "more fair and soft" ("such strength is in meekness," II, ii, 94) as, in the measure in which, Man grows in Wisdom and Love, and evil and error, the veils of Reality, fall.

Such a gloss, of course, by no means catches all the meaning. We may remember, from *A Defence*:—

> All high poetry is infinite; it is as the first acorn, which contained all oaks potentially. Veil after veil may be undrawn, and the inmost naked beauty of the meaning never exposed.

I am very sure that much evil and error remain in my version.

What it may bring out, however, is how true to the Plotinian tradition of mysticism Shelley is. *Ex divina pulchritudine esse omnium derivatur* (From the divine Beauty the being of everything is derived), to quote Dionysius the Areopagite from an apocryphal work attributed to Aquinas.

Another characteristic of Shelley's mysticism is also remarkable here: its *involvedness*. I do not mean only that the syntax is involved—though it is amazingly so—or only that the thought and feeling themselves are so highly *introverted*, in the technical sense used in the discussion of mysticism, but that the meanings of these lines return within themselves; the lovely apparitions offered by the Arts become illumined when the mind casts on them, as a vast concave mirror might, the gathered rays; and yet it is such an apparition—Prometheus, namely—who is here speaking, and speaking, I suggest, knowingly as such. He is describing himself (and Asia, his *Shakti*) as "wandering voices" and "shadows" of "all that man becomes," as "mediators" able to be given "that best worship, love" by man and *to return it*. This "mind arising bright from the embrace of beauty," is no separate individual mind spellbound in

adoration of its own products, though guided and saved by them. It is an ultimately inclusive whole achieving in this way its own self-realization.

The Earth, who, in *Timaeus*, 40C, is "the most venerable of the gods within the Heaven," is here a Being of extraordinary authority, knowing the tongue that is

> Known
> But to the uncommunicating dead,

and able to tell Asia (III, iii, 113), from them, that

> Death is the veil which those who live call life:
> They sleep, and it is lifted.

She has been made mad (III, iii, 123) by Prometheus's pain, poisoned and poisonous by Jove's reign (I, 170–80; III, iii. 94). Henceforth she is to be, in Demogorgon's words (IV, 519),

> calm empire of a happy soul...
> ...gathering as thou dost roll
> The love which paves thy path along the skies.

This Earth it is who directs Prometheus and Asia to "their destined cave." Caves have so great an importance in Shelley that it is worth noting how carefully this cave—on which Prometheus's thought at the moment of his release has dwelt so lovingly; after his salutations, it is the first thing he speaks of—is connected with Apollo's oracle on the rocky floor of Pytho (III, iii, 124–30) and, perhaps, with "the mighty portal" (II, iii, 2)

> Whence the oracular vapour is hurled up
> Which lonely men drink wandering in their youth.
> And call truth, virtue, love, genius, or joy,

and, perhaps, too, with (II, ii, 52)

> a plume-uplifting wind
> Which drives them on their path, while they
> Believe their own swift wings and feet
> The sweet desires within obey.

Evidence, to be weighed, that this most characteristic Shelleyan cave —like some of the others—is the throne-room of Poetry itself, as he defines it in *A Defence*, and that the fountain which

> Leaps in the midst with an awakening sound

is the very head and spring of inspiration. And this indeed it must be from its central place in *Prometheus Unbound* and for Shelley's mysticism. In his *Ideas of Good and Evil*, a title taken from Blake, W. B. Yeats de-

scribes *A Defence* as "the profoundest essay on the foundation of poetry in English." The conjunction of Cave and Temple, which has puzzled so many, does not surprise any who are acquainted with Bhaja or Karla or Elephanta. That Shelley should have turned it into his supreme symbol of the source of Poetry and at the same time of the unacknowledged legislation of the world, "the influence which is moved not but moves," is the distinctive element in his mysticism.

I. A. RICHARDS

KEATS-SHELLEY MEMORIAL BULLETIN, No. IX

LIKE its previous issues, the *Keats-Shelley Memorial Bulletin* in this issue also reflects the, in the best sense, pious regard for the memory of Keats and Shelley which inspires a whole branch of literary studies. Edited by the author of the excellent recent biography of Keats, Miss Dorothy Hewlett, it contains, in a neat balance, three essays in biographical research on the two poets, an essay each in literary interpretation, and an interesting note by Edmund Blunden on the Library Catalogue of Godwin, the philosopher and Shelley's grandfather.

The biographical article on Shelley discusses where and in what words Shelley signed himself atheist. It is of interest that he combined with this the titles "a lover of mankind" and "democrat." For indeed there is a sense in which atheism sets a man free to attempt the practice of universal brotherhood.

Of special interest is S. R. Swaminathan's "Possible Indian Influence on Shelley." In this he suggests, on the basis of exact quotations, some unnoticed sources for the aspects of Shelley's thought which are akin to Indian philosophical tradition. He draws our attention to Miss Owenson's novel, *An Indian Tale*, to Edward Moor's *Hindu Pantheon* and Sir William Jones's translations from the Sanskrit, tracing the evidence of Shelley's having been influenced by these sources. The essay is well written and brings forth evidence to show that "Indian thought and philosophy also contribute to his own, and mingle there with the more direct and powerful Platonic influences.

The *Bulletin* is a publication of the Keats-Shelley Memorial Association, 11 Lion Gate Gardens, Richmond, Surrey, England.

TRENDS IN CONTEMPORARY PHILOSOPHY

WITH A REFERENCE TO THE NEO-REALISM OF G. E. MOORE AND T. P. NUNN

[**Dr. S. N. L. Shrivastava, M.A., D.Litt.,** Head of the Department of Studies in Philosophy, Jabalpur University, outlines some general features of contemporary Western philosophy and some central contributions of G. E. Moore and T. P. Nunn in this interesting article. We hope he will take other occasions to deal with the other schools of contemporary philosophy; for together they represent an important aspect of the *Zeitgeist*, which must be *understood* by those also who hold by the older, sublime hope of a *philosophia perennis*.—ED.]

PROFESSOR JOHN LAIRD has observed that "the present age is a period of acute philosophical fever where the changes are far more rapid than in other eras of more indolent incubation."[1] There is today such a bewildering variety of philosophical schools, pursuing so many different clues, that the student of contemporary philosophy is apt to feel at times that perhaps it may not be wrong, after all, to characterize philosophy, in the words of Carlyle, as a "vain, interminable controversy." So distracted and diversified is philosophical thinking today that anyone seeking a clear grasp of the numerous schools of contemporary thought is apt to find himself in the predicament of the fallen angels in Milton who "found no end, in wandering mazes lost." With the idea of *one* eternal philosophy, a *philosophia perennis*, our age is not only out of sympathy but antipathetic to it *à outrance*. Laird is voicing the spirit of the age when he says:—

> Those who believe in a single *philosophia perennis*, developing, indeed, as an institution develops, but remaining substantially the same on account, rather than in spite, of its changes have a difficult case to defend.[2]

Equally antipathetic is our age towards the idea of a "system" in philosophy. "I am not narrow enough for a system, not even my own system," said Nietzsche, and in saying that he admirably expressed the deepest note of modernism in philosophy. System-building is now no longer considered to be the business of philosophy. To comprehend the nature of the universe as a whole is considered to be a task far beyond the capacities of man. To the modern mind, the philosopher who would attempt to be, as Plato described him to be, "the spectator of all time and of all existence," would simply be wasting his energies in a vain pursuit. The emphasis now

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[1] JOHN LAIRD: *Recent Philosophy*, p. 7.

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 10.

shifts from philosophy as system-building, as a synoptic understanding of the universe as a whole, to philosophy as atomistic analysis or tackling of problems piecemeal and within defined limits. No longer is philosophy to be that

> fine, fiery speed of thought
> By which the ends of the world are brought
> Together....

The cardinal issues in contemporary philosophical discussion, it may be said with some reservations, are not God, Freedom and Immortality, but such questions as: What do we perceive? What knowledge of the external world do we have? What propositions are meaningful? Into what simpler propositions can complex propositions be analyzed? How can propositions be verified? and so on. The characteristically twentieth-century philosophies have pitched philosophy in a new empirico-positivist-linguistic key. Contemporary philosophical thinking is characterized by a radical departure from the philosophies of the former ages both in the topics dealt with and in the manner of dealing with them. Its prevailing tendency has been to make philosophy *scientific* and bring it down from its high speculative flights to conformity with common sense:—

> While admitting [writes Bertrand Russell] that doubt is possible with regard to all our common knowledge, we must nevertheless accept that knowledge in the main if philosophy is to be possible at all. There is not any superfine brand of knowledge, obtainable by the philosopher, which can give us a standpoint from which to criticize the whole of the knowledge of daily life.[3]

A recent school of philosophy which goes by the name of "Logical Positivism" has pronounced all metaphysical propositions to be nonsensical and would not permit the business of philosophy to extend to anything beyond linguistic analysis or the analysis of propositions, sternly adhering to the principle that only those propositions are to be accepted as genuine or possessing any *sense* which admit of empirical verification. No wonder that the present *malaise* in the philosophical thinking of the modern West should have led Professor Hocking to remark that a race of people

> who could beget so *jejune* a scheme of thought as logical positivism which declares metaphysical problems meaningless has every reason to listen to the quiet mind of the Orient.[4]

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[3] BERTRAND RUSSELL: *Our Knowledge of the External World*, p. 73.

[4] "Value of the Comparative Study of Philosophy" in *Philosophy—East and West*, p. 5.

Such is the general mood and temper of contemporary philosophical thinking in the West. I now proceed to give a brief *résumé* of the basic ideas, approaches and conclusions of Neo-Realism, one of the recent schools of Western philosophy. The initial difficulty in a brief survey like this is about the selection of schools to be dealt with; but I hope to find other occasions to deal with other movements of thought which also belong to the present century and may be regarded as typical representatives of the *Zeitgeist*.

Modern realism has developed chiefly in opposition to Idealism. The main target of attack by all the schools of modern realism has been the alleged idealistic doctrine that the being of a thing consists in its being perceived, or *esse est percipi*. That knowledge simply *finds* and does not *make* or *alter* the thing in any way and that the mind has no privileged position in the economy of the universe, is the central contention of all schools of modern realism.

Modern realism is divisible from a geographical point of view into British Realism, and American Realism. The latter has two main schools, known as New Realism and Critical Realism. It may, however, be added here that Critical Realism has its British representatives also. We shall begin our account with British Realism.

G. E. Moore, who recently passed away, was the founding-father of modern British Realism. It was with his celebrated article on "Refutation of Idealism" (*Mind*, 1903) that he inaugurated the Realist movement. The title of the paper is somewhat misleading, in so far as Moore explicitly states therein that he does not propose to refute in the paper what he takes to be the final and common conclusion of all idealists, *viz.*, that Reality is spiritual, but to refute what he considers to be an essential proposition involved in the arguments of all idealists, *viz.*, that *esse* is *percipi*, taking *percipi* to mean not only sensation but also thought. Taking a statement in a recently published article of Taylor to the effect that "what makes [any piece of fact] real can be nothing but its presence as an inseparable aspect of a sentient experience" as "the ultimate premiss of Idealism," Moore undertakes to show in the said paper "that what makes a thing real cannot possibly be its presence as an inseparable aspect of a sentient experience."

Moore turns his powerful polemic against the statement that *esse* is *percipi*, and points out that "*esse* is held to be *percipi*, solely because *what is experienced* is held to be identical with *the experience of it*." The *proton pseudos* in the idealistic argument, Moore points out, is the confusion

between the experience and the experienced, the sensation and the "object" of sensation, the mental act of awareness and the extra-mental object *of* which awareness is had. With an acute and hair-splitting analysis, of which he is a past master, Moore argues that our sensation of blue is quite different from the blue of which we have the sensation, that "'blue' is *not* the content of the sensation of blue." "Blue," says Moore, "is as much an object, and as little a mere content, of my experience, when I experience it, as the most exalted and independent real thing of which I am ever aware."

It was with this trend of argument that Moore blazed the Realist trail which Russell, Alexander and others were to follow. There is hardly any contemporary Realist who does not owe his inspiration to Moore.

The heart-point of the New Realism inaugurated by Moore was his doctrine of the transparency of the mental act by means of which we are able to apprehend the objectively real. It was Moore who gave currency to the doctrine that awareness lights up the objects, as it were, and shines through them, so that they become transparent or diaphanous. Nothing intervenes between knowledge and the known. Knowledge is a *direct* revelation of the real. With this doctrine Moore sought to give a smashing blow to the current representationist or image theory of knowledge and reformulate the theory of sense-data. The sense-datum is not a subjective image, in the mind, of something objective corresponding to it, but is the objective something itself. It enters direct into the mind and the mind shines through it. It may be remarked here that although Moore concedes the objectivity of sense-data and their existence independently of the mind, he has not been able, in spite of his hair-splitting analyses, to state precisely and decisively the relation between the sense-data and the physical objects. In one of his well-known papers on "The Status of Sense-data," Moore begins his discussion of the question "how sensibles are related to physical objects" with an initial confession, "I feel extremely puzzled about the whole subject,"[5] and indeed ends with the puzzling assertion that the sensibles are neither "in physical space" nor "in the mind," nor *immediately* known in their relation to their sources or the physical objects.

Another thinker in England, in the early days of the rise of British Neo-Realism, who was in no small measure responsible for giving the movement its characteristic form, was T. P. Nunn, an educationist: he wrote little on philosophy but what little he wrote had far-reaching influence. It was his contribution to a symposium on "Are Secondary Qualities Independent of

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[5] *Philosophical Studies*, p. 185.

Perception?"[6] that gave the direction to the characteristically modern trend of Realistic thought. He made Stout's earlier articles[7] the chief target of his attack. Stout had maintained that at least *some* elements in our experience exist only in being perceived, for example, pain. Nunn contended that pain had the same manner of objective existence as any material object. Pain also, he said, "is something outside my mind, with which my mind may come into various relations." The secondary qualities, Stout maintained, exist only as objects of perception or "sensa." For example, if we look at a buttercup in a variety of lights, we shall perceive different shades of colour, but we have no reason to suppose that the buttercup itself changes. Or, to take another example, different men immersing their hands in a bowl of water will report different degrees of warmth. We have, however, no reason to suppose that the temperature of water changes with different persons.

To all these arguments Nunn gave a most uncompromising retort. He argued that the difference between "actual properties" and "sensa" was altogether untenable. The scientist and the plain man who insist on there being one standard temperature or one standard colour do not realize the complexity of the situation. There are, in fact, Nunn argues, not one hotness but many hotnesses, not one yellow but many yellows. A thing is hotter an inch away than a foot away and hotter to a cold hand than to a warmer. Similarly a thing is a paler yellow in one light than in a different light. The usual material thing of everyday life becomes, on Nunn's analysis, completely revolutionized. It becomes a collection of appearances, though each appearance is independent of the mind.

S. N. L. SHRIVASTAVA

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[6] *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, 1909.

[7] *Ibid.*, "Primary and Secondary Qualities" (1903) and "Are Presentations Mental or Physical?" (1908).

THE ABC OF PEACE

[**Mr. Roy Bridger,** an enthusiastic pioneer of the back-to-the-land movement, comments in this article upon the dangers of our atomic age and suggests ways and means to overcome them. To Mr. Bridger man must be understood in relation to the totality of Nature, and he supports most ably his plea for a return to rural life with data and examples drawn from biology and ecology.—ED.]

HOW MANY PEOPLE are even now aware that in 1945 the world situation changed as suddenly and as drastically as if we had all stepped on to another planet?

From the moment of the "successful" explosion of the Hiroshima atom bomb the terms of our predicament became grim indeed. Even if all existing nuclear weapons were to be destroyed and the arms race stopped, the basic situation would still not be altered. The knowledge of the methods of production of these weapons cannot be destroyed. If the need arose, it would take only a short time before the stockpiles were rebuilt. The possibility of destroying the human race is here to stay, for tomorrow and for all the rest of our history.

All along, war has always been a constant, fought out with the most effective weapons available. We may suppose, though in the face of disquieting counter evidence, that man is gradually growing better tempered. But can the process be accelerated sufficiently—in the time—to eliminate the sheer rhythm of war altogether?

More and more people are beginning to feel they ought to do something about it. Yet the everyday world seems to go on just the same. The visible range of protest seems limited. A letter to one's newspaper, perhaps, supposing one could think of something that the professional platform people hadn't been proclaiming with maximum eloquence all along.

But beyond that one seems to be rather powerless.

On the other hand, it is probably true to say that the individual has more potential power today than at any time in history, because the means and speed of communication have been so greatly improved. Individual power used collectively, of course, as manifested in "trends" and "movements." And they must be trends of the right kind; the movements must be in the right direction, amounting in aggregate to an integrated programme for a stable form of society. Indeed, there is plenty of scope. Man can hardly be said to have got his proper bearings on this planet yet. To some extent he still lives in a world of fantasy, his real situation not fully apprehended.

Admiral Wright, NATO Supreme Commander, Atlantic, has described the new nuclear-powered submarines as "invisible electronic brains for watching the enemy." This raises the question of who the enemy actually is. The simple old-time feuds of man's primitive stages of development are grievously unworthy of his new precision apparatus. Yet the folly of it is that the real enemies are gaining ground all the time.

By 1941 the dozen or so *Popillia japonica* beetles noticed in a New Jersey nursery in 1916 had increased to a vast population defoliating over 250 species of trees and plants extending over most of the eastern half of the United States. The wheat stem sawfly is recorded as having arrived in the U.S.A. in 1889, where it has been spreading ever since. Earlier in the nineteenth century the gipsy moth had arrived from Asia, also to become a major pest. Everywhere pests of one kind or another are reaching plague proportions.

Yet it is only comparatively recently that the underlying causes of these outbreaks have been recognized. The whole story, as ecologists have now pieced it together, may be studied in a recently published work by Charles Elton, Director of the Bureau of Animal Population, Oxford University. It is called *The Ecology of Invasions by Animals and Plants* (Methuen, 30s.).

"We are living in a period of the world's history," says Dr. Elton, "when the mingling of thousands of kinds of organisms from different parts of the world is setting up terrific dislocations in nature." The story begins a very long time ago, perhaps a hundred million years, when six main land masses, each with its own flora and fauna, separated off into what are known as "Wallace's Realms." Until modern times they have remained more or less sealed off from one another, each developing, without undue disturbance, its own natural equilibrium. But with the rapid acceleration of the means of communication the world has been opened up to all comers. Man's cultivated crops and domestic livestock now lie at the mercy of tens of thousands of immigrant predatory and parasite species, and the situation is getting worse all the time.

Is it too late to reach a harmonious settlement with the natural environment? There is reason to think not, but more realism will be needed in ecological planning, land use and, probably, population distribution. To continue with the present issue, pest control stands today at the crossroads. It can continue with its blind suppressive campaign against specific organisms without reference to their "message," and with no assurance of lasting success, since these organisms are continually building up resistant strains. It can continue with its ever-increasing dislocation of the soil community, since most insecticides kill both pests and their own natural

enemies indiscriminately. Or it can build on the insight and wisdom of the old injunction "Live and let live."

The natural background of farm and garden crops is not static; it is very much alive. If some toning down of specific pests is called for, it would seem a relatively innocuous move to encourage their natural enemies. Biological control is making considerable progress in various parts of the world. In Peru, for instance, it has been found that the best way to control a certain caterpillar attacking cotton plantations is to plant adjacent land with maize, which harbours the caterpillar's natural enemies.

Behind the farm and garden background stands the local landscape, and behind that the totality of nature. In nature all species advance together. If it were otherwise, nothing of consequence would ever be built up. It is quite erroneous to visualize a food crop as the one wholesome entity to be snatched brusquely and defiantly from an otherwise hostile background.

In the same way, it is the vainest of vanities to glamourize man as a Prince of Denmark with no need for a supporting cast. Man is no more than the outlines of a jet of water flowing from a tap; the outlines of the jet remain the same, but, isolated from the organic nutrients which flow into him and through him from the ends of the earth, he would come to an abrupt and irretrievable end.

It is not merely a question of maintaining food supplies. Our vital nutrients include, for instance, oxygen. It has been calculated that if all existing plants were suddenly destroyed, supplies of free oxygen would be exhausted within two or three thousand years.

Plants! But not, in this case, necessarily food plants. For the purposes of oxygen-renewal the main engines of photosynthesis are the trees of the world. Forests are indispensable to man in all manner of ways, and, as forests and food crops between them occupy half the surface of the earth, it emerges that man's drive from the landscape he first inherited to one of concrete and steel must sooner rather than later be substantially modified.

And if we are going to save the forests, we are at once heavily committed to nature protection. For a forest, too, is a social organization. It may flaunt the glory of a Prince against a stage background of nondescript extras, but it could last no time at all without them.

Thus we may see that the root cause of excessive vulnerability to pests is monoculture. Precariously balanced pure strands of field and garden crops, single-species timber plantations, and vast congregations of livestock without intermixture, are all asking for the trouble they will certainly get. It is the biologically rich and varied community which has the strongest defences against sudden invasions.

Thus the woodland theme, with its variations, must remain the key element in land usage. "The challenge of afforestation must be met if the world is to be made a better place to live in." The assertion could have been made by any modern silviculturist or soil conservationist. Coming from Pandit Nehru, it acquires considerable added significance. India's voice in international politics is notably for peace, and in home affairs her statesmen are striving towards corresponding advances in biological stability. Particularly striking developments have resulted as regards that aspect of environmental equilibrium involving wise use of tree cover.

In fact, from China to Peru the overwhelming importance of forest conservation is being recognized. Whatever its other differences, the world is not much at variance as to the need to look after its trees. The Fourth World Forestry Congress sponsored by the F.A.O. was held in India in 1954. The Fifth World Forestry Congress is scheduled to meet in the U.S.A. in 1960—a major occasion, we may be confident, in the search to make the world a better place to live in.

If all nature's languages were as well understood the world would be not merely a better place, but a completely transformed place. Unfortunately, in the other main biological fields progress towards stability lags some way behind. Most of the other potentially renewable resources of the world stand in as much need of sustained-yield planning as forestry, but they are not getting it. Man has still to shake off the impression that his consumer goods are all produced from an inexhaustible hat.

> We are living in a Golden Age [says Aldous Huxley], the most Golden Age of human history—not only of past history, but of future history. We are living like drunken sailors, like the irresponsible heirs of a millionaire uncle.

For instance, throughout the world one of the most vulnerable points in crop-production economy—on or off the farm—is failure to handle organic waste products efficiently. On the farm, the ordinary manure heap is usually a contrivance for discharging valuable nitrogen into the atmosphere. The main trouble is insufficiency of cellulose, in the form of litter, for absorbing the nitrogen in the dung and urine, while careless handling generally cuts off aeration; packing sets in, oxygen supplies get used up, and a nasty smell proclaims that putrefaction has replaced fermentation.

Off the farm, in the public cleansing services the idea of utilization has fortunately made much more progress along the road at the end of which the word "waste" will have become more or less meaningless, and the processing of refuse and sewage just another stage in the endless cycle of

organic materials from soil to plant, from plant to animal and man, and so back to the soil again.

The essentials of composting—the orderly processing of organic wastes—are to combine a relatively large amount of carbonaceous, or vegetable, matter with a relatively small amount of nitrogenous, or animal, matter, and to keep these materials on the move (thereby breaking them down into smaller and smaller particles with a correspondingly larger surface area) in the presence of sufficient air and moisture to cause fermentation.

"The difficulty of adopting composting in countries like Canada, the U.S.A., and Britain, where labour is dear and scarce, will be solved by the mechanization of the process," forecast Sir Albert Howard, pioneer of the Indore process of composting, back in 1931. Two main mechanized techniques have so far been evolved, both embodying simple yet ingenious principles. The plant at St. Helier, Jersey, is typical of the vertical silo system, in which prepared wastes are hoisted to the top of a tower, to be dropped in twenty-four stages through a series of six platforms. In the Dano revolving cylinder the material is kept on the move continuously, the essentials of composting being completed in the short space of five days.

In India composting has been going ahead for many years, many States having compost legislation on their statute books. An annual Compost Week was launched in 1951. News is coming in rapidly of composting developments in many other countries. The *First* World Compost Congress has yet to be projected, but summit talks on this basic theme are a prerequisite of peace in a world with shrinking resources and expanding populations.

Apart from considerations of natural beauty and recreational amenities, ecology warns against the danger of finding no time for nature, lest in the process nature should have no time for us. One paramount task if the world is to be kept in biological running order is to maintain adequate tree cover. Since future life will depend on how efficiently we process organic residues, we should begin to think in terms of national compost services. There still remains the vital question of the human element. Man owes much to the rest of nature. What does he owe himself?

For a species condemned like all others to progress only across the dead bodies of worn-out generations, there can be no such thing as "perfect health" for the individual. At the most there can be only a certain maximum staying capacity, before the rocket falters in its upward flight. The individual *in adequate health* is equipped with the faculties for maintaining a livelihood until the relatively brief spell at the end of life when energies

imperceptibly fade away. Under modern conditions, however, the necessary requirements are proving hard to meet. It is showing up everywhere, in fact, that the more mechanical efficiency is perfected, the more humiliatingly the human performance lags behind.

To make things worse, there is almost universal confusion between "health treatment" and "medical treatment." Particularly unrealistic is the widespread reluctance to trace ailments back to their dietary sources—the snack of toothache for breakfast, the helpings of gout and thrombosis for lunch, the tea-time plate of ulcers cheerfully washed down with cups of kidney trouble, the ceremonial death-dealing ritual of the evening banquet, and so on.

It has been estimated that it takes three or four generations to build a healthy human being. Our health policy would thus need to be planned, not in terms of suppressive treatment of individual disorders, but towards the establishment of whole populations with the ability to keep well naturally. The work of McCarrison, Weston Price and others has made it clear that such a policy must be based on whole, unrefined foods consumed in balance and in moderation. More recently Sir Edward Howard and others have produced evidence for the existence of "quality elements" able to circulate between soil, plant, animal and man.

But although dietary influences are profound, they are not the whole story. Earl Russell has told of a city child who, confronted for the first time with the earthy magnetism of a country lane, fell on the damp mould uttering strange animal cries. "The organic need that was being satisfied," he comments, "is so profound that those in whom it is starved are seldom completely sane." For a species on the threshold of an atomic age the prospect of sick and mentally unbalanced men shuttling between hospital and parliament, between the operating table and the international conference, could hardly be more alarming. Was this the ache, post-nuclear historians may ponder, that launched a thousand rockets?

So that there remains the last and perhaps the greatest enigma—how we should group ourselves. Can urban civilization endure? Or is a new deal based on biological stability emerging at its fullest integration in the land settlement movement of Vinoba Bhave and Jayaprakash Narayan?

ROY BRIDGER

THE BEST MEANS

[In this simple, earnest essay, **Dr. V. V. Bhatt** touches upon basic questions: the need to change human nature if we hope to build a fairer social structure; the folly of "The end justifies the means"; the hopelessness of force as a means of reform. Readers who remember his "Civilization on Trial" and "The Human Factor in the Crisis of Our Times" in our 1957 volume will recognize the same concern with the moral factor—which becomes ever more important as material factors add to our power and problems but not our wisdom.—ED.]

WE ARE at present on the threshold of mighty changes. The question of ends and means is of peculiar significance when vast changes are in the offing. The naïve yet common belief that ends justify means must be subjected to the most searching criticism. To many it seems a self-evident belief. Their belief is based on the assumption that good ends can be attained indifferently by good or bad means. They even seem to believe that good ends can be attained more speedily by using bad means than good. Building their superstructure on these sandy foundations, they argue: Why quarrel about the purity or the impurity of the means if the Promised Land is reached through them? On their assumptions, one would be a fool to surrender certainty for an uncertain, doubtful spiritual satisfaction. But what if the Promised Land is not accessible by these crooked, devious paths?

All history is proof that good ends remain unrealized if bad means are used. One can give countless examples from the hoary past, but let us limit ourselves only to two world-shaking revolutions; for they attempted the solution of the very problems which we are called upon to face today—the French and the Russian Revolutions. Liberty, Equality and Fraternity were the ends that the former sought. To end all exploitation, to establish a classless society of the free and the equal, to restore the dignity of human life, were the aims of the Russian Revolution. They tried to attain these ends by means of violence and bloodshed. With what results? Individual liberty was the first victim of a ruthless dictatorship, which created inequalities far more glaring than existed before. The gorgeous dream of liberty was shattered by the very means adopted. The beautiful vision of a society of the free and the equal was blotched with blood.

The problem these revolutions tried to solve, the greatest problem before us today, is: How to guarantee individual liberty, yet ensure that it will not be used against the common interests of mankind? A little reflec-

tion will show that the successful solution of this one single all-pervading problem will simplify all other complex difficult modern problems.

It is, in fact, contrary to all accumulated experience of the past, contrary to all modes of rational thinking, to hope for a new era of love by engendering the sense of hatred. It is futile to think of a beautiful plant blossoming out of a rotten seed. However good the imagined end, it is the means that give it colour and shape. If you want a good plant, the seed also must be good. However unpalatable, then, the conclusion is inevitable. Good ends require equally good means for their attainment, if the means used determine the nature of the final result achieved. However good [the imagined end, its goodness is powerless to counteract the effects of the bad means used to reach it. What we attain by bad means is not the end envisaged but a perversion of it. Here, then, stand the Machiavellians: they are unable to distinguish between ends and the perversions that will be attained by their way.

That ends justify means is, in its results, a dangerous and anti-social belief. Under it, individuals or nations can constitute themselves the final arbiters of the goodness of the end, and so justify themselves in using any methods whatever for attaining it. Today, when individual personality is crushed on countless excuses, we need to create conditions within which an individual may realize his best self.

How shall we bring about the desired change? Is it through violent convulsions and bloody wars, is it through evoking a sense of hatred and a thirst for vengeance in the human heart, that we are to bring about the dawn of a new era of love and world brotherhood, of liberty and equality, of peace, prosperity and progress? Or is it through peaceful persuasion and appeal to reason, through self-immolation and self-sacrifice, through the overpowering force of love and suffering, that we are to establish that magnificent harmony of human life? From time out of memory man has tried to bring about change and establish the reign of love and peace by means of bloody conflicts and violent sanguine warfare. But as yet that dream has not been realized; on the contrary, that vision of a new era of love and peace seems to fade farther away. Is this fact alone not a sufficient proof of the failure of violence and all methods depending upon it to realize our end? For the truth is that love can never be made to grow in the human heart by engendering the sense of hatred; nor can peace be established by killing the evil-doer. What is necessary is the eradication of evil and not of the evil-doer. And evil can be eradicated only by changing the evil nature of man, which is possible only by self-immolation, accepted suffering and self-sacrifice, the result of deep love even for the evil-doer.

For the human spirit when lit by divine fire is stronger than the mightiest armament.

There is no other way than this to bring about a change in human nature. Those who are already enlightened have on their shoulders a great responsibility to bear. They are the holders of a trust. It is upon them and those who are like them that the advance of humanity depends. They must ceaselessly try to re-educate the people by all possible means. They should try to change the people not only by means of speech and writing; such an attempt would hardly be successful. More things are wrought by an example of upright living than by mere words or thoughts. Their personal life should become a source of inspiration and enlightenment to others. Their deep love for mankind should induce them to appeal to the higher nature of man, rouse it from its dormancy and thus move minds and hearts by means of self-suffering and self-sacrifice, by the overpowering force of love and suffering. If they fail to do this, it will be treason to humanity. It is upon those enlightened few that the future of humanity depends. Unless they create a ferment in society, unless they create a public opinion in favour of such a change, no amount of force can bring about the millennium.

But even after a favourable public opinion has been created, it might be argued, a little use of force will be required to bring about a change in the social structure. For public opinion will be passive unless the social structure is changed. And those who have vested interests in the present structure of society will be deaf even to the generous solicitations of their own enlightened conscience. Their own immediate self-interest will deaden their finer sensitiveness. A little pull will be found necessary to bring them along.

The ideal force to be used for overcoming even these negative, inert resistances will always be the overpowering force of love and suffering. Physical force should be applied only to the minimum extent absolutely necessary. More important, those who apply this force must be sure in their heart of hearts that they are actuated by the law of love and truth and that, if it had been possible, they would never have resorted to force. Even so, physical force, the bad means used, will have its effect upon the end that is attained. Its effects will have to be counteracted by further compensating acts of love. This delicate weapon will certainly be suicidal if handled by persons not actuated by the law of love and truth.

Within these conditions, it seems that the use of violence can only be the prerogative of God. For men, violence will always produce the results of violence and, once resorted to, will tend to beget more violence. Thus

even from the pragmatic point of view the use of force and violence has no justification; while, for those who believe in the unity of life, violence is impossible. Non-violence is the law of the species and if we cannot bring about the desired changes through non-violence, the fault lies not with the weapon of non-violence but with ourselves. Non-violence is the weapon *par excellence* for uprooting evil. If we learn how to handle that weapon, the Kingdom of God will be at hand.

V. V. BHATT

SOMETIMES I SEE

(Translated from Marathi by R. P. SIRKAR)

Sometimes I see
In myself a grotesque man,
A trivial unevolved disfigured Caliban.
Through darkness and mud
With subterranean gait, like groping roots,
Wanders the vermin life
Flaunting its wretched form
Loathsome as witches' claws,
Creeps in blindness,
And lives in sickly brooding dark
This grotesque man!

Sometimes I see
In myself a Promethean man
From whose feet blossoms an unprophesied dawn!
Whose form like Himalaya stands,
Crowned with sunlight's rays,
From whose breast holy Ganga springs,
On whose lips the *mantra* that conquers death.
Close against the sky his tremendous head,
As smiling he turns the constellations' sacred luminous text
Life's farer on the way of deathlessness,
Sun on his brow, the elixir of life in each limb,
Eternal resurrection in his auspicious eyes.

Myself Caliban, myself Prometheus,
And yet only the witness undemonstrable
Of these two:
Of subterranean dark; of heavenly space.

MANGESH PADGAONKAR

A BUDDHIST APPROACH TO FREE WILL

[In our April 1959 issue we published an interesting article by Mr. Kenneth Dutfield on "Our Freedom and Theirs" and invited our readers to compare his argument with Shri Jivaka Kumara's account in the same issue of Buddhist teaching on the self and not-self. Shri Jivaka Kumara, who has now constituted himself **Sramanera Jivaka,** himself has been stimulated to apply his Buddhist approach to the question of free will, in this short article, which suggests persuasively that perfect freedom is in perfect integrity.—ED.]

THE PROBLEM OF FREE WILL is one of the pivots of moral philosophy; for, unless the choice of action is free, no praise or blame can be accorded, and praise or blame implies the existence of an objective standard of rightness and wrongness in human behaviour. That it is part of our mental make-up to assume the real existence of such a standard is undeniable; from this assumption have grown up codes and systems of laws throughout the world. Moreover, there is a concomitant objective standard of the limits to assignable responsibility; an infant or small child, a lunatic or mental defective, are not held indictable for crimes for which a sane and responsible person would be expected to pay the severest penalties.

It is assumed, then, that when a man performs an act he could quite as easily have done something different; when he chooses one thing he could equally well have chosen its opposite. Even when the blunt instrument is raised aloft above the unwitting victim's head, the agent can still refrain from bringing it down and lay it aside instead. It is because of this assumed capacity for doing otherwise than he has done that a man is considered to deserve hanging if he chooses to be a murderer.

The assumption of the agent's responsibility is at least a healthy sign, and it is better than the unfortunately increasing tendency to believe that anti-social persons are the victims of their environment, inadequate social security or lack of parental control or else that they are sufferers from some obscure complaint rendered by the generic term "psychosis," so that they are no longer able to choose between right and wrong but are the victims of "an uncontrollable impulse," and therefore do not merit punishment but should be treated as gently as any hospital patient.

In moral philosophy the hypothesis is generally accepted that men are free-willed beings. In theology there is a wavering between this view and that of predeterminism, the idea that God directs all the events in the lives of every man, woman and child in the universe and orders what He thinks best for each. In the latter view, ultimately the individual sheds all

responsibility and shrugs accusations off with "It is as Allah wills." A third view, which arose only in the last fifty years, gave a startling new aspect to this religious idea and came from the scientific laboratories in the form of the theory of behaviourism, whereby we are seen as no different from automatic machines out of which, when a penny is dropped in, an article unfailingly comes. The human being is a mere mass of reflexes, some admittedly very complicated, but still reflexes and in essence no different from the knee jerk elicited inevitably by a tap on the tendon.

Some Eastern religions add a fourth viewpoint, that of Karma, whereby the good and bad actions of our past lives determine our actions in this present one and therefore we are indirectly rather than directly responsible, in that we are unable to remember our past lives and so, apparently, do not benefit by our experiences in them, yet can bear in mind that our actions in this life will determine our actions in future lives. This viewpoint, of course, is not regarded in Western philosophy or theology, since it assumes the truth of reincarnation, which is not generally acceptable to the West.

Could I have acted differently? This is the crucial question that has to be answered when considering the truth or falsity of the idea of free will in any given circumstances. If the answer is "Yes!" then it is assumed that I consider myself a free-willed being. If it is "No!" then there must have been some constraint, whether from Divine intervention, from my genetic make-up or environmental history, from some external physical force or from my *karma*.

An outstanding contribution made by Buddha to philosophy was the annihilation of dichotomies, and the demonstration of the inapplicability of the Law of Contradiction above a certain level of thought (as I tried to show in my previous article "Neither Self nor Not-Self," in THE ARYAN PATH, April 1959). Can this be applied to the problem of free will? Let us reconsider the question already asked and answered and answer it again in a directly opposing manner.

Could I have acted differently? If the answer is "Yes!" then I did *not* act freely. I must have renounced the alternative from some *motive*. Was it a sense of duty, a desire, fear, affection, anger, a sense of honour, or some other small part of my mind, presuming to speak and act for the whole of me? Then I was a slave to a small part, a desire or an emotion. If the answer is "No!" *then* I acted freely; for I acted with the whole of myself; there was no part of me left out of my acting which might later make me regret it; I acted as a Unity, a momentarily unified Self instead of the enormous diversity within to which I normally apply the term "Self,"

quite mistakenly.

Now here are two directly opposing answers to the same question. According to the Law of Contradiction in formal logic, both may but one *must* be false. According to Buddhist logic, both *may* be true—indeed, here it is obvious that both *are* true—but even as the two logics deal with different levels of thinking, so the two answers deal with different levels of being. The first applies to man as a machine, unmindful and not self-aware; the second applies to the man who has set foot on the path of evolution and has begun to integrate his personality, so that it shows less diversity, fewer changing moods and reactions to external events and therefore a greater calmness and stability than is possessed by the ordinary man who cares more for material than spiritual acquisition.

Behaviourism is vindicated—but in a revolutionized form! We do what we do because we are what we are. This present act is the result of all my past acts (both in this life and in previous ones if one wishes to take the doctrine of Reincarnation into account). We are not free to choose by now; we have made ourselves machines and we no longer act—we react.

How then does this apply to the social system of today? Man becomes wholly responsible for his actions. The "uncontrollable impulse," which has even found its way into the brief-cases of counsel for the defence, is shown to be non-existent. If an impulse is *uncontrollable* it is because it is the sum total of past *uncontrolled* impulses; as self-control can become a habit, so also can lack of self-control, and hence the individual is finally responsible. Similarly, psychoses (other than those due to cerebral injury or disease) and neuroses are all within the individual's power to inhibit or nourish as he chooses and the choice will depend on his past choices in this matter.

If this were generally recognized, then there would be more understanding of the present urgency of inculcating the practice of self-control and self-discipline from childhood upwards and for the necessity of becoming more aware and less mechanical in our every-day behaviour.

Mindfulness is as much the keystone of Buddhist ethics as the annihilation of dichotomies is of Buddhist metaphysics. Only by the practice of Mindfulness and the development of Self-awareness can we throw off the shackles that keep us all unwittingly enslaved. Only by the practice of Mindfulness and the development of Self-awareness can we become free-willed beings in Reality. Only by the practice of Mindfulness and the development of Self-awareness can we gain Enlightenment.

SRAMANERA JIVAKA

THE ROMANCE OF TOWERS

[To THE THOUGHTFUL OBSERVER monuments in stone have a language of their own which reveals many things. **Mr. Dudley Glass** interprets in this article the language of that "flower of architecture," the tower, and tells us what different towers have said to him.—ED.]

THROUGH HISTORY man has enriched the world's architecture with lofty towers. Sometimes the motive has been utilitarian—defence or observation—at other times religious or that of beauty. From the rugged grey masses of the north to those slender shafts of colour against the southern blue, they ornament the horizon. The moonlight of the Orient reveals them in an Arabian-Nights splendour; a New World of the West scrapes the skies with their modernistic majesty.

Sometimes poets and tellers of tales erect towers for our imagination that almost have the quality of reality. We can visualize dawn lighting the "Sultan's turret" of Omar Khayyam's *Rubaiyat*. Princesses from the pages of Grimm dwell in the baroque towers of fairy-tale castles. In a mysterious wood Maeterlinck fashions a shadowy tower from which Mélisande, wooed by Pélleas, trails her long tresses. Tennyson sings "many-tower'd Camelot."

The Tower of Babel in the Bible, reaching presumptuously towards Heaven, was possibly inspired by the pride of Babylonia's temple-tower of Etemenanki. This was one of the many stepped pyramids of the ancient Chaldean and Assyrian world; also to be found in Egypt and as far afield as the Occidental lands of the Aztecs and the Incas. Sun-worshippers these, and there were also tribes whose priests saluted the moon and stars from high places. Likewise the early Persians bowed to fire from raised platforms on small towers.

The Orient has always been beautified by towers. Carved, sculptured gateways to India's temples are a form of these and many a lake-palace has its pinnacles. Agra's roseate citadel, of the marble courts and pavilions and bath of a thousand mirrors, raises an exquisite Jasmine Tower. Set in a wall of this balconied boudoir there was one more magical mirror. A reflecting jewel, it enabled Shah Jahan, deposed from his throne and almost blind, to see down the Jumna River the white dome and minarets of the Taj Mahal, towered tomb for his "Exalted One."

Like mirage visions in desert lands minarets crown mosques to sound a call to prayer. Just as impermanent-looking are those tapering, many-storied towers of the Far East, Chinese pagodas making fantastic silhouettes. Yet ancient China had simpler towers of stalwart masonry for defence

on the rambling Great Wall.

Military strategy was the reason for most of the first towers. The Romans built them with battlements to guard city ramparts. Tradition ascribes the Tower of London by the Thames to Julius Cæsar, but its historical foundation was laid by William the Conqueror. His Norman keep, the White Tower, built for defence and to overawe the Londoners, rises among many others with stern associations. Now peace reigns on Tower Green and there is colour in the glowing costume of the Beefeaters, the "Ceremony of the Keys" and the glittering opulence of Crown Jewels on display.

The Tower of London has been introduced to millions who will never see it through the medium of Gilbert and Sullivan light opera, just as the voice of another tower is regularly broadcast to the world. For in the Clock Tower adorning the House of Parliament at Westminster hangs "Big Ben," called after Sir Benjamin Hall, first Commissioner of Works at the time of its installation. A light shines each night in the Clock Tower, just as a flag flies from its comrade the Victoria Tower, when "the House" is sitting.

The English countryside is studded with towers; there are twenty on Windsor Castle alone, small ones carried by the walls, culminating in the central "round" one, or nearly so, that gives this noble pile by the silvery Thames its personality. Then there are the cathedral cities blessed with their solemn towers, and centres of learning wearing them like dons' caps on the colleges. Of all Oxford's landmarks Magdalen College is the most famous. Its special feature is a minareted tower of the Middle Ages dominating that erudite street termed "the High."

At the dawn of each May Day choristers in surplices ascend the tower to salute the rising sun with a Latin hymn. This tribute to a benefactor dates from the first Queen Elizabeth's reign and still it mingles with merry jangling bells to waft over the meadows by the River Cherwell.

Scottish and Welsh castles have their towers telling of brave deeds, in the south of romantic Ireland one murmurs with legendary associations. Blarney Castle, close to Cork, is all the more picturesque for the large red stone high up on a crumbling tower wall. The name of the place recalls a remark made by that same Queen Elizabeth when Dermot McCarthy, the Lord of the Castle, sent her amiable messages to postpone his surrender. "That is all Blarney and means nothing!" she exclaimed. Nowadays folk who feel in need of this Irish accomplishment make for the edge of the turret where they manage to lean over backwards to perform a time-honoured act.

There is a stone there,
That whoever kisses,
Oh! he never misses
To grow eloquent.
'Tis he may clamber
To a lady's chamber,
Or become a member
Of Parliament.

Leaving soft green hills for nature's white towers in Norway, marvel at the man-made crest at Holmenkollen, outside Oslo. This unique ski-tower allows experts to speed down its snow-coated slope in the strenuous competition of an annual ski-jump. Also, concealed in that impressive sweep, is a museum to tell the history of ski-ing in the country which invented the sport.

Denmark, although not endowed with mountains, is well served with towers. They dignify manor-houses in parks and mingle attractively with Copenhagen's domes and twisted spires and green copper roofs. Hans Anderson told no better tale than the one concerning the *Rundetaarn* (Round Tower). Built as an observatory by order of Christian IX, it has no stairs inside but a spiral ramp winding to the top. This is also the case in Amboise, of the French Chateau Country, where the Emperor Charles V was enabled to make a perilous but successful ascent in a coach-and-four. In the case of the Copenhagen variety, Peter the Great of Russia did it on horseback, leaving the use of the coach to his Empress.

The low country of Holland is alive with wooden towers whirling their windmill sails. They contrast with the static ones of stone reflected in city canals. Amsterdam has its eleventh-century Mint Tower, originally a fortress although now it is embellished with a clock-dial and a set of chimes. By the harbour stands the curiously-named "Weepers' Tower," from which Dutch sailors departed on world voyages, to the sorrow of the women they left behind. Yet this same tower speeded Henry Hudson in the *Halfmoon* when he sailed the Atlantic to discover Manhattan Island and the river now bearing his name.

Very different from this squat sentinel by the Zuyder Zee are the shining towers rising out of New York Harbour to form an incomparable skyline. The Statue of Liberty is one in itself, of reasonable height to allow a welcoming torch to be seen, but many of them are of dizzy height. The world's tallest tower, measuring over a hundred storeys, is called the Empire State Building.

An American poet of the past, Longfellow, preferring towers of the Old

World, summed up a pride of Belgium in a well-known stanza:—

In the Market Place of Bruges
Stands the Belfry old and brown;
Thrice consumed and thrice rebuilded,
Still it watches o'er the town.

A stalwart tower that could face misfortune, it was not only in the service of the Church but also that of the State. On one occasion the Belfry summoned citizens to arms; at other times laws were promulgated from its balcony and proclamations by the Counts of Flanders delivered to townspeople in the Grand Place below. In present-day Bruges passers-by listen to the bell tones of Flemish airs played on the renowned carillon above the tower-watchman's room.

Masons with an inspired mission built the cathedral towers of France. Their graceful Gothic architecture is frozen music, although one at Rouen names itself a "Butter Tower." The reference is to the circumstances of its erection; funds were offered in return for permission to eat butter during Lent. Twin-towers of Notre-Dame guard their historic river-island in the heart of Paris; in the more modern section of the city a Gothic fragment stands alone, called the Tour St. Jacques. A statue under the vaulting commemorates Blaise Pascal, who stood on the summit to make experiments in atmospheric pressure.

Similarly a bust of Alexandre Gustave Eiffel hides itself under a striding colossus by the Seine. Conceived by an engineer famous for his bridges and viaducts, the Eiffel Tower is more than an extravagant gesture from the 1889 Exhibition etched for ever against the Paris sky. When he unfurled the tricolour at its opening—and the Premier of France apologized for his own opposition—Eiffel knew that his three-platformed, glass-pavilioned tower had also a scientific future, now apparent in its use for meteorological, radio and television purposes.

Castles in Spain are decked with airy towers; so are the fanciful, sugar-cake affairs that Germany perches on crags by the Rhine or on wooded mountain slopes of Bavaria. A "quaint old town of art and song" like Nuremberg has carried them on its walls since mediæval times. If the castle hill presents a grim prison-tower with five sinister corners, there is a happier one on the Frauenkirche overlooking the square. At midday its clock-face opens doors to release a moving row of mechanical mannikins, nothing less than Charles IV and the Seven Electors!

Play-acting clock towers are frequently to be found in Middle Europe as in Switzerland. Addicted to toy effects, they give an entertaining panorama of history or legend. On the other hand the Alps cradle them with

lips tightly locked, like the Water Tower keeping guard over Lake Lucerne. Its stones could tell us a secret: that the beacon "light" of the four cantons shone from it in the days of William Tell, a matter for pride; while a pink chateau among blossom by Lake Geneva tries to forget that its thick-walled tower once kept the Prisoner of Chillon from the radiance of day.

Some of the world's most beautiful towers are in Italy; their purpose in life is to chime bells and their name in itself is music. The domed cathedral of St. Mark's is a wonder of Venice, but so is the *campanile* standing by its side on the piazza. This has a past reaching back to Doge Pietro Tribune who laid the foundation stone in 912. Having borne the weight of a thousand years the original bell-tower collapsed; so the present one is a glorious resurrection. A golden angel still surmounts it, to look beyond the Grand Canal to the Adriatic as a guide to mariners.

Another Italian *campanile* catches the imagination, not only for its grace but for the attribute giving it such a remarkable name. The Leaning Tower of Pisa, pink and white between its side colonnades, has a perfection of detail, but it chooses to slant fourteen feet out of the perpendicular. Some would have it that this was a prank of the designers; more than likely the foundation sank and the inclination began at an early date. At all events Galileo availed himself of the oblique phenomenon, dropping objects and calculating their velocity in his study of gravity.

In the valley of the Arno a fair city dreams of a past golden with painters, sculptors and poets No wonder that the bell-tower by the Duomo is of especial loveliness and has earned the highest praise Ruskin can give: "The model and the mirror of perfect architecture."

The master began it in 1334, on the ducal instructions that he must surpass in beauty of structure anything previously attempted. He did not live to see his design completed beyond the first storey, but fortunately Pisano and Talenti continued the upper part of the Gothic square with appropriate grace. Not only are Giotto's contours superb; so are his rich details. Ornaments abound in sculpture and bas-relief; allegorical figures include the Seven Cardinal Virtues and such contrasting types as Eve and Orpheus, Aristotle and Euclid. Marble glows under the Italian sun in variegated hues of pink, dark green and white. Yet the Campanile, with open-work pattern, is never overloaded but floats as spiritually as the chiming message it spreads to the surrounding hills.

Seen from them as a tall lily-shape in the garden that is Florence, heard echoing in the soft airs of Tuscany, it symbolizes the beauty and at the same time the usefulness of that flower of architecture, the tower.

DUDLEY GLASS

NEW BOOKS AND OLD

SHANKARACHARYA'S DISCIPLES ON ADVAITA *

HERE is a giant volume of special interest to students of Indian philosophy in general and of Advaita Vedanta in particular. Though Śaṁkara's *sūtrabhāṣya* is peerless in lucidity of diction, its subtleties of thought can be grasped best with the help of standard expositions provided by direct disciples of his like Padmapāda and brilliant expositors like Vācaspatimiśra. While the latter's *Bhāmatī* is completely available, the former's *Pañcapādikā* is but a fragment which explains, as it were, only Śaṁkara's preface to his mighty work, as it stops at the end of the *catussūtrībhāṣya* (*bhāṣya* on the first four *sūtras* of Bādarāyana). Though it modestly purports to be just a gloss, it lays bare in fact the entire background of Śaṁkara's philosophy in a thoroughgoing manner and the *Vivaraṇa* thereon by Prakāśātman completes the task with such grace and force that it has long enjoyed the reputation of an authoritative original work in classical Advaita literature. The authority achieved by these is evidenced by the respect with which their views are summarized by later textbook-writers like Mādhava and Appayya Dīkṣita, even when the views are not shared by them. In the history of post-Śaṁkara Vedānta, the *Vivaraṇa* and *Bhāmatī* became the fountainheads of two streams of thought, each of which found a long line of able expounders.

These classical works have been often published, as also Mādhava's *Vivaraṇaprameya-saṁgraha* and Akhaṇḍānanda's *Tattvadīpana*. The commentaries provided in this edition — the *Prabodhapariśodhini* of Ātmasvarūpa and *Tātparyārthadyotinī* of Vijñānātman on the *Pañcapādikā*; and *Tātparyadīpikā* of Citsukha and *Bhāvaprakāśikā* of Nṛsimha on the *Vivaraṇa* — are useful ones published for the first time. The Madras Government deserve the gratitude of scholars for making these available even from single MSS. in their MSS. Library, necessitating lacunæ in parts.

Śaṁkara's doctrine of *māyā* has proved puzzling as much to modern minds as to Rāmānuja and Madhva in earlier times. Its best rational and orthodox exposition is furnished in the volume before us. The enigma of the relation between the individual self and the Absolute is solved by what is known as the Theory of Reflection (*pratibimbavāda*). Questions like the relative status of reason and revelation, the nature of Truth and Error and the dichotomy of religious duty and philosophical quest are discussed threadbare in their relation to other systems with true logical acumen. And the value of the commentaries towards the understanding of the originals is great as they quote widely other sources germane to the discussion. But the value of the edition to critical scholars is considerably reduced by the absence of an index of the authors and works quoted. Ātmasvarūpa's references to Sundarapāṇḍya (p. 373) and of Citsukha to Dharmakīrti (p. 636) are only two examples

* *Pañcapādikā* of PADMAPADA with commentaries of ĀTMASVARUPA and VIJNANATMAN and *Pañcapādikāvivaraṇa* of PRAKASATMAN with commentaries of CITSUKHA and NRSIMHASRAMA. Edited by S. SRIRAM SASTRI and S. R. KRISHNAMURTI SASTRI. (Government Oriental Manuscripts Library, Madras. xx + 136 + 792 pp. 1958. Rs. 28.75)

at random.

The Editor, Shri Srirama Sastri, has written a regular dissertation in Sanskrit to disprove the view of some ancient and modern writers (like Nāgeśabhaṭṭa and Y. Subba Rao, respectively) that *mulāvidyā* (primary Nescience) is not beginningless according to Śaṁkara as made out by later writers. While we are all admiration for the vigour with which the Editor has taken up the gauntlet, marshalling a wealth of material culled from a wide range of Advaita literature, we cannot help remarking that its length is out of proportion to its importance. If it had been boiled down to the minimum, more useful matter about the life and works of the authors in question could have been included. Even as it is, the Editor's account of the differences in doctrine between the Vivaraṇa school and the Bhāmatī school is praiseworthy.

Despite a few misprints, the printing is excellent and the edition should prove a valuable addition to all libraries in which Sanskrit has a place.

K. KRISHNAMOORTHY

Religions: A Preliminary Historical and Theological Study. By D. W. GUNDRY. (Macmillan and Co., Ltd., London. 189 pp. 1958. 16*s*.) Received through the courtesy of the British Council, London.

Can we *decide* to have no religion at all? Dr. Gundry's excellent book is an answer to this fundamental question from the historical standpoint as well as from that of the experience and tradition of the human race. "Religion," as the author says, "is far too deep-rooted to disappear. Indeed, where attempts have been made to eradicate religion it always comes back in some veiled form."

The book attempts to answer the question, "What is Religion?" and it traces the development of the religious quest of Man in the ancient world, in the undeveloped religions and in the great traditions of the monistic and monotheistic religions of the world.

There are two main points of interest in the book: The first is Dr. Gundry's concern over the growth of secularism in modern Western society. He says:—

> A pathetic secular faith has grown up, particularly in our western modern society flushed by its powers of organization in thought and practice, which believes that science will reveal all the truth and that we have only to go on researching long enough to have enough knowledge to be able to organize a perfect society.

This secularism is present in non-Communist as well as in Communist societies:—

> In Russia we see a conscious effort to put an end to non-scientific ways of thinking; but we should not suppose that this attitude is absent in our own society.

The second point is the author's thesis that the noblest expression of man's communion with a divine power is found in two main types of religion, monism and monotheism. He says that Buddhism is the crown of the former, Christianity of the latter. While the author agrees that divine compassion is present in all historical religions and that God has "descended" out of compassion for man, Dr. Gundry considers the "descent" of God as *avatar* "no more than a myth," but "the Incarnation, Death and Resurrection of Christ to be actual historic deeds of God in his Redemption of mankind."

It seems to me that the symbolism and function of the myth or the mythic is misunderstood; the Sanskrit word *Purāṇa* means both the mythic and the historical. The mythic is not in the past: "The myth leads back to a re-

mote, primordial past: to events, heroes, and gods who *pre-exist everything that is*" (*Diogenes*, Number 7, 1954, p. 37. "The Mythic" by ERIC DARDEL. Italics mine). Eric Dardel's view of the mythic expresses better the Indian idea of *Purāṇa*.

There is a lucid review of the theories of the origins of religion in Chapter II. Dr. Gundry reviews several theories, historical and psychological, of the origins of religion but concludes:—

> The most important kind of origin of religion is the metaphysical. This is the transcendent source which is God himself.

And he adds:—

> Knowledge of God is not obtained as a result of inductive reasoning, i.e. by a scientific gathering of data and then a drawing of conclusions from it; but is a given fact.

This book will greatly interest students of comparative theology and history of religion. Although it is written from an openly Christian viewpoint, it is not ignorant of other religions. It gives evidence of wide and accurate scholarship. "There can be no such thing," as the author says, "as absolute impartiality where vital matters are concerned: but sympathy with the sincere beliefs of others there must be."

N. A. NIKAM

Hinduism: Its Meaning for the Liberation of the Spirit. By SWAMI NIKHILANANDA. (World Perspectives. George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., London. 189 pp. 1959. 16*s*.)

The Swami proclaims as the methodical basis of his book his firm belief in the teachings of Śankarācārya — of classical Vedānta with the additional explanations provided by Sri Rama Krishna. The reviewer welcomes this standpoint, also believing that Śankara's philosophy (about 900 A.D.) and his interpretations of the earlier creative period of Indian thought represent the greatest contribution of India to world philosophy.

Only with regard to the later and present deductions from these grand Indian concepts there may be sometimes a difference of opinion between author and reviewer. The modern political and polemical interpretations — the East-West confrontation with apologetic emphasis on the higher value of India's notions — seem to me not to add to, but to detract from, the classical eternal values of Śankara's dogma of the essential Oneness of the Cosmos. Thus, in order to point out the correct Vedāntic dogma that reason and intellect are but preliminary stages before the highest intuitive vision, the author chooses an unfortunate Western example. On page 96 he contrasts this Indian notion with Plato's teaching of intellect as the highest means of enlightenment. But is it not just Plato, the last truly cosmic thinker of the West, who proposes the *Agathon*, the Good and Perfect, as the ideal of which all empirical and rational values are but more or less imperfect representations? The author rightly, but in this case unfortunately, devalues Western "systems" as bound to intellect alone. Plato was of the same basic belief; therefore he calls his visions *theoriaí* — exactly equivalent to Indian *darśanas*, viewpoints. Only since Aristotle and his rationalistic followers is the term "viewpoint" replaced by *sy-stema* or *sy-stasis*. Herewith human *hybris*, Man being the self-appointed judge of order and selection, comes in. Plato, on the other hand, adhered to the humble and receptive view of keeping himself open as a subtle receptacle to higher vision. He indeed is in this respect still a true cosmic seeker.

The Swami, imbued as he is with old Vedāntic tradition, otherwise sets a shining example of objective detachment and undisturbed serenity in propagating

Śankara's dogma, that everything in this world is only a relative — not a constant — value.

The *māyā* of this world is to be interpreted not as a mere illusion and irreality, but only as a relative and transitory manifestation of the grand Beyond, the ideal Brahman. From this religio-philosophical attitude everything empirical is seen as a value — though only a limited, partial and momentary one.

Comparisons between all-empirical phenomena are the outcome of this belief in the interrelation of all manifestations of the indescribable "It" and serve to loosen empirical limitations so as to gather more and more indicative facets of the hidden centre of truth. As such this book of the Swami is rich in traditional similes which are more than artistic and pedagogical devices; they are humble and effective attempts to approach the absolute Divine through its tangible radiations.

On the whole, the Swami succeeds — in the sense of ancient Vedānta — in leading his readers to the meaning of the Liberation of the Spirit, as the subtitle of this book proclaims as its aim. His "Hinduism" lays bare the creative and timeless values of Hinduism at its best.

BETTY HEIMANN

The Quaker Way. Prepared by the EDUCATION COMMITTEE OF THE GENERAL MEETING FOR AUSTRALIA OF THE RELIGIOUS SOCIETY OF FRIENDS. (40 pp. 1958.)

This little book is meant for children but would be of interest to older people also who have heard the name Quaker and would like to know what it stands for. It can be read in half an hour and is a mine of information. It tells a little about the beginnings of the movement and brings out clearly the various points on which Quakerism differs from other varieties of Christianity. Anyone wanting to know how the Society is organized, what the central beliefs of its members are or why Quakers have no creeds, ministers or sacraments will find here the answers to these questions. But though the differences and the reasons for them are made clear, what emerges even more clearly is the essential unity of spirit between Quakers and people of other churches and religions who share one or two of their central beliefs. For example, belief that there is "that of God in every man" is not confined to Quakers. Nor is the assurance that follows that belief, that before God there is absolute equality irrespective of race or class or colour or sex or creed; nor the subsequent total rejection of war and violence as means of achieving God's will. What distinguishes the Quaker movement is that, throughout the three centuries of its existence, it has, *as a movement*, witnessed to this belief and the way of life engendered by it.

MARGARET BARR

Concise Dictionary of Judaism. By DAGOBERT D. RUNES. (Philosophical Library, New York. 237 pp. 1959. $ 5.00)

The trouble with "concise," "condensed" and "digested" books of any sort is that they are so frustrating. We always suspect that, in his efforts to live up to the adjective, the author or editor leaves out precisely those things which would interest *us*! They also generate a certain sense of guilt: we feel like the child who scrapes off the butter and the jam, leaving the nutritious (albeit soggy) bread untouched. When it comes to dictionaries on a given

field of learning the difficulty is greater still. If we know the subject the definitions seem totally inadequate. If we don't — the amount of technical terms and editorial assumptions is overwhelming. Yet, because our age deems it a virtue to travel fast, cook under pressure and make every second count, the abridger of books and his readers consider themselves modern and efficient.

On the other hand, it is just possible that the beginner will find stimulation for further study and research. And this happy thought saves the author's conscience, justifies the publisher, pacifies the expert — and cautions the reviewer. It also pins the challenge on the reader, who has now been taken to the trough.

The Dictionary is all these things and more. It is also the commendable attempt of Dr. Dagobert Runes to focus attention on the vast field of Jewish learning, to highlight some of the problems, achievements and personalities of the Jewish people. As Dr. Runes is a well-known writer on philosophy, it is natural that he should give greater consideration to the philosophical aspects of Judaism. Indeed the best parts of the book are those dealing with post-tenth-century thinkers and mysticism.

There are, as there have to be, many alphabetically arranged definitions and explanations of the various Biblical books, Talmudic teachings, Zionist developments and a host of present-day Jewish problems. The book is replete with prominent Jewish personalities through the ages and some excellent photographic reproductions. Mention is made of virtually all important Jewish customs and the Hebrew terms for them are adequately explained. Understandably, the American Jewish scene receives a good deal of attention, but, regrettably, the rest of Jewry (with the exception of Israel) does not fare so well.

Dr. Runes's definition of "Beni Israel" as "Groups of Jews in India, dark and probably mixed with Hindu blood" (p. 35) is a good example of the "concise" technique: it is superficial and in no way helpful. To allocate the prophet Isaiah eleven half-lines but devote over fifty to such peripheral Jews as Felix Adler and Johann Hamann is misleading and lacks perspective. One also gets the feeling that Dr. Runes's acquaintance with the Hebrew sources of Judaism is but on a nodding level and that he has had to rely on German and English writers, periodicals and yearbooks for his information.

For the non-Jewish reader who desires a glimpse of the scope of Jewish learning this is none the less a useful volume and the measure of Dr. Runes's success will only be determined by the reader's further quests. The *Concise Dictionary of Judaism* is a good menu and should prove (as all good menus do) a stimulator of the appetite and helpful in selecting items worth chewing over.

HUGO GRYN

The Assurance of Immortality. By HARRY EMERSON FOSDICK. (James Clarke and Company, Ltd., London. 125 pp. 1958. 7*s*. 6*d*.); *The Conquest of Fear*. By H. C. ROBINS. (S.P.C.K., London. 30 pp. 1959. 1*s*.); *Irreligious Reflections on the Christian Church*. By WERNER PELZ. (SCM Press, Ltd., London. 128 pp. 1959. 8*s*. 6*d*.)

Here are three small books, each, in its own way, presupposing the Christian interpretation of the Gospel facts and drawing varied implications. The first is a reprint of *The Assurance of Immortality* (originally published in 1918) by the famous American divine Harry Emerson Fosdick. Many arguments have been formulated for human survival

after death and most of them are simply and competently adumbrated in the chapters on "The Significance of Immortality" and "The Possibility of Immortality." Thus far the book represents a reasonable argument for the view that death is not the end of all. However, behind the closing account of Assurance, wherein the element of hope comes in, can be traced the experience of one who believes in Jesus Christ, risen and living. Nevertheless the whole falls short of the full Christian understanding of Eternal Life.

The second book, though small in compass, is more positive. Dean H. C. Robins of Salisbury confesses that he has been

> a prey to fear and worry all my life. I have had to fight a grim and desperate battle, not always successfully, against these enemies.

In *The Conquest of Fear* he gives personal testimony to the ways in which God has helped him to master his fears and anxieties. It is a simple and sincere example of how a Christian applies scripture and experience to the solution of a universal problem of daily living.

The third book is of a different kind. Werner Pelz spent the earlier part of his life in Germany and went through grim and testing experiences in the dark years. He is now an Anglican parson in England. From his continental background he looks with clearer eyes than do many native Anglicans on certain contemporary manifestations and distortions of Christian living and thinking. His *Irreligious Reflections on the Christian Church* is, in effect, a radical criticism of the religiosity which so often takes the place of true religion. Behind every word, positive and negative, sounds the trumpet blast of the sixteenth-century Protestant Reformation: By Grace alone; by Faith alone. Over all presses the insistent question: What is theology all about? The reader may learn from Mr. Pelz not a little of the answer.

MARCUS WARD

The Freedom of the Will: The Gifford Lectures delivered in the University of Edinburgh, 1957. By AUSTIN FARRER. (Adam and Charles Black, London. 315 pp. 1958. 28*s*.)

There are so many things one would like to know about the free and the unfree will. How, for example, can we have more of the one and less of the other? How are the two related respectively to free (or right) thinking and to unfree (distorted) thinking? But it would be idle to expect to get to know any of these things from a book which, like this one, proclaims itself by its title to be "philosophy." For the latter is a thing of conventions or rules, to neglect any of which is to lay oneself open to the charge of not talking or writing "philosophy."

One such rule, of long standing, is that the freedom of the will must be discussed in connection with the body-mind relationship. This latter question is not only barren and insoluble in itself but throws as much light on the nature of willing as it would on that of lyric poetry, for example. But Dr. Farrer as a Gifford Lecturer and theologian to boot is very conscious of his duty to "philosophize." True, he is a linguistic philosopher, that is, one who conceives of himself as discussing language and not as laying down the law about what cannot be or cannot but be. As such he might have dismissed physical causality by simply saying that if the language of physics had been useful for talking about man's willing it would have been used for that. But linguistic philosophy has its own rules, one of which is to write whole libraries pointing out minutely, for example, all

the misunderstandings that might arise from our taking "the apple of my eye" for an expression on all fours with "the apple of my tree." And that is what Dr. Farrer does most of the time, but so subtly that his book will be a joy to all who love subtlety for its own sake. And he does at least adumbrate the more serious questions one would like to see raised and for which he thinks he has cleared the way.

He also says some wise things. For he is a man of wisdom. Also of wit, academic if not always Attic. But here, again, one must protest against a practice which is not confined to Dr. Farrer. You do not even begin to raise the problem of the nature of decision for the reader unless you write in such a way as to give the *feeling* of what it is to make a decision. Now, no decision is just funny when viewed from the inside and nearly every decision is so when viewed from the outside. To give always funny or trivial examples is not to take the reader into the heart of this subject, just as to do so would be not to take him into the heart of religion. This, I am sure, Dr. Farrer must appreciate.

PHILIP LEON

Human Types: An Introduction to Social Anthropology. By RAYMOND FIRTH. (A Mentor Book. New American Library of World Literature, New York. 176 pp. 1958. 50 cents)

Professor Firth has already an international reputation as an anthropologist and his *Human Types* has been recognized as a textbook in most universities teaching anthropology. The reprint in the Mentor Series is a welcome addition and the illustrations that are retained make an otherwise readable book even more interesting. Anthropology is among the neglected social sciences and books like the present one tend to make it more popular, particularly at a time when the history of human culture is getting a new value and meaning.

The chapter on "Racial Traits and Mental Differences" has been fully revised and, unlike the old-fashioned colonial anthropologists claiming superiority for the modern man over primitive tribes, the author is able to look at the latter with sympathy and understanding:—

> The mind of the savage works in the same logical ways of perception as does our own mind. Here the field tests of psychologists and the experience of the anthropologist agree. . . .
>
> To say that the savage is inferior in mentality to ourselves, or to say that he has the mind of a child, indicates the ignorance and prejudice of the speaker. It is absurd at this stage of our knowledge to assert that we have proof that any particular group of people such as the Australian aborigines or South African Bantu, are by the nature of their minds for ever precluded from taking advantage of education, and from reaching that cultural level that we have attained.

The learned author has succeeded in establishing for anthropology a sound place in the field of the social sciences and in the scheme of social values. Even though the anthropologist may not succeed in finding a single key to unlock the door of progress, he is helpful in making the basic analysis which indicates the causes of difficulty and showing how greater conformity to realistic conditions can ease tensions. He usually proves to be more practical and realistic than the theoretical sociologist who struggles to search for the less known laws of social progress.

P. G. SHAH

The Aztec: Man and Tribe. By VICTOR W. VON HAGEN; illustrated by ALBERTO BELTRAN. (A Mentor Book. New American Library of World Literature, New York. 222 pp. 21 plates, 55 figures. 1958. 50 cents)

The Aztec is a name to conjure with and the literature on the tribe has been increasing ever since the lost Aztec empire was rediscovered. Hagen's concise and well-written book has easily superseded older books like Vaillant's *Aztecs of Mexico.*

The tribe made its sudden appearance in about 1168 A.D. from the raw colder zones of North America and settled down on the site of the present Mexico City. Their real name was the Tenochas; they were sun worshippers, who in about three hundred years developed its romantic culture in the ancient city Tenochtitlan. The floating garden in modern Mexico City and the massive temples and the Calendar Stone will not be forgotten by the present reviewer, who visited the Aztec country seven years ago. The name Aztec was given by the treacherous Spaniard adventurer-conqueror Cortez, by whose hands the Aztec empire was ruthlessly destroyed.

Although the Aztecs were fabulously rich and lived a life of splendour, luxury and comfort, their kings were really elected speakers and there were no state halls except in song. Their temples were big and stupendous. They were extremely religious and believed that human sacrifice — of a live heart taken out in front of the temple with an obsidian knife — pleased the gods so much that they need not fight the conquerors even though the latter were armed with new weapons, canon and horses. It was only about four hundred soldiers under Cortez that overpowered a huge city of priests and merchants ruled by an ever-suspicious astrologer who undervalued military fighting and organization.

The cultural life of the Aztecs provides many points of comparison with India. The temple-cities, the war-lords, the merchant-princes, the human carriers (the Aztecs had no cattle), the *tortilla* bread of maize so similar to Indian *roti*, the perfection of the use of paper, the jewellery, the marriage-knot, the calendar — have all an attraction for the Indian reader.

P. G. SHAH

Tribal Demography in India. By C. B. MAMORIA. (Kitab Mahal, Allahabad. 151 pp. 1959. Rs. 5.00)

The monograph, a pioneering demographic survey, removes a long felt want in the growing volume of anthropological studies in India. The chapters on the peoples of India, tribes, their classification, standard of living, social and civil conditions, the rôle of the State in their rehabilitation and the author's "solution of the problem" are full of informative data and provide, on the whole, a thumb-nail picture, very welcome to students of the science of Man, in our museum of races, India.

The author radiates an intimate knowledge of the basic conditions of life and social customs of our teeming pre-Aryan brethren. He focuses our attention on the economic and welfare schemes sponsored by our national government and notes the progress achieved under the two Five-Year Plans and the yeoman's service done towards the rehabilitation of the submerged millions of the Adibasis.

In his chapter on "Solution of the Problem," Shri Mamoria analyzes the three proposed solutions, *viz.*, "assimilation," "bringing down tribesmen to the plains" and "isolation," and rightly observes that an iron curtain between the tribes and civilization would be

suicidal to our national interests.

For centuries, the tribals and the civilized communities have been living in close culture-contact and provide an interesting pattern of unity in diversity — that is, India. Through ages, the natural laws of absorption have played their part imperceptibly enough and have raised the standard of many aboriginals like the Santals and the Garos — making them the most amenable to civilization. Now our Welfare State has undertaken extensive measures of aboriginal uplift. Not that we are unaware of the lurking dangers of conscious missionary effort to revolutionize the sets of values, special to the aboriginal, which might make them tenth carbon-copies of the advanced commmunities; but there can be no question of reversing the trend towards closer links. Shri Mamoria's reflections are very thought-provoking and emanate from a sincere study of the aboriginal problem.

CHARULAL MUKHERJEA

The Case against Hunting. By E. W. MARTIN. (Dennis Dobson, London. 128 pp. Illustrated. 1959. 12*s*. 6*d*.)

This book is inspired by a deeply humane spirit. The author does not harrow us with descriptions of animals suffering, or raise our ire against those who hunt. For these he suggests, as one who himself loves to hunt, the innocent substitute of the "drag." He recognizes that the sum of cruelty in fox-hunting is a minute fraction of the total, and that it is comforting to criticize another's pleasure while preserving and condoning our own. He does expose the hunt as a "Grand Opera" with its historical origins interwoven with class privilege, and with an intoxicating influence on its devotees such that they are unable to think objectively of the inner nature of their activity, which is finding pleasure in cruelty.

Abolition of hunting rests on a changed attitude of life. There is need of an ethical renaissance, a *rapprochement* between Christianity and thought, out of which will be born a reverence for all life. The book centres on this moral issue and rightly so. Its value would be enhanced did it argue more closely the case against hunting as an economical control of pests, and did it treat it as but one symptom of a canker that eats at the heart of civilization. Other and worse symptoms are vivisection and the treatment of animals being reared for food.

G. H. BROWN

Anne Brontë: Her Life and Work. By ADA HARRISON and DEREK STANFORD. (Methuen and Company, Ltd., London. 252 pp. 1959. 25*s*.)

Through all the glare of Brontëan publicity the youngest sister still sits partly in the shadows. Her literary star is the faintest of the three, and her personality does not emit sparks. There is no mistaking the aloof and wayward genius of Emily; and for long there was no evading Charlotte's domination in her combined rôles of family-manager, press-agent and biographer. She emphasized Anne's sweetly modest nature in a delicate frame; but found it shocking that this pious little creature should, in her second novel, have drawn so realistic a picture of profligacy and drunkenness. Yet Charlotte knew well enough that their brother Branwell was the model. For better or worse he had involved Anne in his desperate situation while she was a governess and he a tutor at Thorp Green. His predicament became her hardest experience, and unless she had had a share of the creative writer's passion and stern detach-

ment she could not have turned it to good use.

Ada Harrison, in writing the first biography devoted to Anne alone, shows an attentive sympathy that goes far beyond Charlotte's sisterly egotism in probing a reserved and secretive temperament. Anne's verses, while never approaching the strength of Emily's, give more away about her personal life. Behind her love poems is the fascinating curate William Weightman, probably remote enough from her in actuality, even before his early death. Her religious poems, if too smoothly tailored, indicate the struggles and strivings of a soul not always ripe for faith.

Anne's life was indeed unhappy, limited and frustrated; but the Brontë determination and power of release served her in a manner that is no mere echo of her sisters. Mr. Derek Stanford underlines this in discussing her work — though he overweights the poetry by pretentious talk of "existentialism." On the two novels he is soundly perceptive, and reminds us incidentally that George Moore was Anne's most distinguished fan.

SYLVA NORMAN

The Romance of the Rubáiyát: Edward FitzGerald's First Edition Reprinted with Introduction and Notes. By A. J. ARBERRY. (George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., London. 244 pp. Illustrated. 1959. 25*s*.)

This book is published on the first centenary of the publication of Edward FitzGerald's First Edition of the *Rubáiyát* and the author's purpose is to pay a tribute

> to the man whose unique genius has given the world infinite delight, and whose services to literature in general, and to Persian studies in particular, by the merit of this immortal poem exceed all measure and excel all praise.

The story of Omar Khayyám's quatrains can rightly be called a romance. FitzGerald's incomparable version was published in 1859, after three years of hard work, and anonymously, by Bernard Quaritch, at a shilling a copy. It did not sell and was remaindered at a penny a copy. But it was discovered by those able to appreciate this finest of poems, Rossetti, Swinburne, Burne-Jones and John Ruskin, though the author's name was not revealed until 1876, when the poem had reached a third edition. An Omar Khayyám Club was founded in 1892 and included many famous members.

But in spite of the beauty of FitzGerald's translation, criticism was directed at Omar as a poet, and the opinion was held by European scholars that he was a very mediocre writer, in fact rather an anthologist, and that the quatrains attributed to him were the work of other men. The fact that the MSS. then known to the public were all late made it more difficult to ascertain the authenticity of the poems.

But Professor Arberry was fortunate in discovering two much earlier MSS. These prove that Omar did in fact compose a large number of quatrains, and that he was regarded, within seventy-five years of his death, as a considerable poet.

Professor Arberry, in this book, includes certain hitherto unpublished letters written by FitzGerald to his friend Professor Edward Cowell, on the subject of the quatrains, and is able to follow FitzGerald's progress as he worked upon "the finest and most famous translation ever made." FitzGerald first translated the quatrains into Latin and Professor Arberry includes a corrected edition of these. There is an Appendix, in the nature of a scholar's commentary, which contains his own annotations, including facts which he considers

will be found new and helpful to the understanding of FitzGerald's work. FitzGerald's stanzas are reprinted, with notes, and there is a Bibliography of some of the most outstanding contributions to the story of the *Rubáiyát*.

This book is most interesting and undoubtedly a valuable addition to the literature on this subject.

MARGARET SMITH

The Penguin Book of Canadian Verse. Edited with an Introduction and Notes by RALPH GUSTAFSON. (Penguin Books, Ltd., Harmondsworth, Middlesex. 255 pp. 1958. 3*s*. 6*d*.)

The editor's mannered, often pompous and pretentious, Introduction to this anthology of Canadian verse written during the last hundred years does it and its poets small service. With a few exceptions, there is scant evidence here that the poetry of Canada "is a poetry of distinction," or that present-day Canadian poets are "writing as well as any of their contemporaries in England and the United States"; while there is plenty of evidence that "the literary techniques, the advances of Yeats and Eliot" had not, as Mr. Gustafson suggests, been "assimilated" by 1936 or so, but remain in most cases "influences" and points for imitation. Some sixty poets are represented; yet one listens almost in vain for that something strange, as it were a whisper from another dimension, which speaks to the inward ear in all poetry worthy of the name, though in this sense Carman, Klein, Watson and Souster were or are poets, differently though the whisper sounds in the lines of each of them. Poetry is not to be made by the merely intellectual exercise of putting words together in peculiar ways, and it is in this characteristically adolescent exercise that many of the younger poets here printed are engaged.

It is a pity, then, that Mr. Gustafson should imply a claim for Canadian poetry as a whole that it is already grown up and fully individual. Evidently it is not; but there is much that is refreshing and hopeful in this book, and anyone interested in a national verse which will one day speak not only with the voice of Canada, but sometimes with the voice of poetry itself, will find it well worth its modest price.

R. H. WARD

The Mirror of Light. From the Notebooks of RODNEY COLLIN. (Vincent Stuart, Ltd., London. 89 pp. 1959. 13*s*. 6*d*.)

Those who treasure *The Theory of Celestial Influence* and other works by the late Rodney Collin and who value anything from his pen will find that, in this book, the publishers have made a last offering of various notes from his miscellaneous papers, notes jotted down from other sources, or as material for the talks in the Gurdjieff-Ouspensky-Nicoll tradition for which he was known. For those not acquainted with his books, the following random quotation may give an idea of his thought:—

> Consciousness is awareness of our surroundings and of ourselves in them. Conscience is awareness of the effects of our actions on our surroundings. It is alertness to right and wrong. Alertness, awareness, both mean being awake, remembering oneself. Conscience is alertness of mind, of the three parts of the mind that come together in us and make consciousness. Conscience is incorruptible, the best that we have. It is the continuity of this life to eternity.

L. MARR

The Technique of Correlation in Basic Education. By A. B. SOLANKI. (Navajivan Publishing House, Ahmedabad. 194 pp. 1958. Rs. 2.50)

This work fulfills a great need in the field of Basic Education, for it examines the rationale of the technique of correlation. It has been rightly stated that Basic Education is "wrongly equated with the wider concept of Nai Talim." The fact of the matter is that Basic Education is a stage of *Nai Talim* or New Education. *Nai Talim* aims at the creation of a new social order based on co-operative work. Its objective is to develop every child in such a manner that he acquires an understanding of his rights, responsibilities and obligations to society. For this end in view, every child must have

> full opportunity for the balanced and harmonious development of all his faculties and should acquire the capacity for self-reliance in every aspect of a clean, healthy and cultured life....

All these are fine aims and objectives. But how to achieve them? For this purpose the technique of correlation was suggested. This technique has been understood by a few and misunderstood by many. It is, therefore, very gratifying that perhaps for the first time we have before us a clear and correct exposition of the technique of correlation in Basic Education. It is bound to be of great use to Basic Educationists all over the country. It is our hope that this book will be eventually published in Hindi and other Indian languages also, so that it may be used by the village teachers as well.

SITA RAM JAYASWAL

Sotte Voce. By "VIGNESWARA" (N. RAGHUNATHAN). (B. G. Paul and Co., Madras. 352 pp. 1959. Rs. 4.00)

Light, chatty, discursive and entertaining, the periodical causerie has its own attractions for the ordinary reader. In the hands of a craftsman like the author, who is a veteran journalist and a scholar, it achieves additional significance. In fact Shri Raghunathan has widened its scope by trying to make the causerie a medium for

> snapshots,—brief glimpses, not merely of the needs and lacks, but also of the immortal longings and the endless promise of a great people, of the infinite richness and variety as well as the spiritual unity that is India.

The hundred and fifty-seven articles collected here from his articles in *Swatantra* and *Swarajya* during the past thirteen years bear ample testimony to this claim. We are indeed provided with sumptuous fare — rich in variety, taste and value. Thus music, language, literature, morality, sex, politics, personality, dress, education and co-education, science, law, mythology, all are discussed in a style that arrests the reader again and again, now with wit and wisdom, now with apt allusions and quotations. The lines quoted at random will indicate the quality of "Vigneswara's" brilliance:—

> Millionaires are like ice-bergs.
>
> Civilization is not a matter of lace and lipstick.
>
> Genius is a happy accident.
>
> Every language is a trinity. It has a body, a mind and a soul.
>
> Inscrutable are the hearts of Editors.

In his views "Vigneswara" is an advocate of healthy conservatism, and checks such as his are quite necessary for the progress of India.

R. BANGARUSWAMI

LOVE'S BEGGAR: SISTER KATREI

[OUR OLD and esteemed contributor, **Shrimati Lila Ray,** sends us this poem from an unpublished volume, *A Portrait Gallery of Women.* "All my Indian life," she writes (she was born an American), "has been spent among women and I have known many, some of whom have given me poems."—ED.]

"I know right well that all you say is true but you must understand I never shall want anything except to be a beggar till I die."

"Thou art mistook."

"Then mistaken I will remain," said she, "I choose poverty and exile; that none can take from me."

—*Meister Eckhart*

Exile I choose and poverty
For these I need not fear to lose.
None can take them from me.
None will envy me. I beg.

What flaw in my loving
Led to my failure, lord?
In the arrogance of ignorance
I mistook the nature of love.

Little I knew of love!
Divesting myself of myself
I surrendered wholly.
Dying I did not die.

Not good enough was my best,
Not strong enough my heart,
Void of all, of all bereft,
Loveless I am left.

No sacrifice suffices
To make one lovable.
No self-immolation
Can win a heart's devotion.

In the depths of my desire
Love is a derelict dream
Flotsam on the sobbing shoulders
Of a shaking sea.

Lost I am, lost for love,
Lost in love, lost to love,
Lost as air that is clear
Is lost in luminosity.

No more will I write of love
No more of the warmth that wells
within
For I have chosen poverty
Which none can take from me.

Love is the lilt of a dancing skirt.
Love is a sunny insouciant day.
Love is a fisher tree
Netting stars by night.

Love is a shaft of light
Plunging to the blue depths
Of cavernous valleys, mining
The shining wealth of the heart.

Love is the unfurling frond
Of a curly shuttered fern.
Love is a melody
That brings the sky to its toes.

Love is a spindle which wins
The long threading rain
From dark cloud cotton.
Love is sun-sheltered mountain.

Love is a lotus petal,
A ladle for ecstasy's libation,
Inverted it becomes
A hissing serpent's hood.

Inexplicable is the evasiveness
Of love, defying definition.
Not willed nor comprehended,
Love is known, not spoken.

Unaided, instantly,
Love unites by affinity.
Effortlessly
It draws passion's tides.

Equivocal are love's ethics.
Duty derides it. Love
Absolves by dissolving
Hardness into softness.

Unconditionally
The bud of being flowers
And the blossoming of love
Is unconditional.

Immutable, intangible,
Innate is this treasure.
Let none envy me. I beg.
I have chosen poverty.

When the lenses of love,
Fixed by the thunderbolt
That turns the leaves of trees,
Set straightly in a line

Inward and outward
In a single focus fuse.
Wholly the eye opens
To see as a seer.

I will write of love no more.
Content is love, contained.
Love needs nothing.
Out of it responses rise.

Forgive me for my failures.
Nameless as God I wander.
For one who hopes for happiness
Is not equal to the quest.

Lost I am, lost for love,
Lost in love, lost to love,
Lost as air that is clear
Is lost in luminosity.

Exile I choose and poverty
For these I need not fear to lose.
Sensitive and sentient I beg.
Let none envy me.

LILA RAY

THE TYRANNY OF METAPHOR

In a most stimulating wireless review of Giovanni Miegge's book, *Visible and Invisible* (*The Listener*, May 21st, 1959), J. P. Corbett, Lecturer in Philosophy, Oxford University, refers to the paradox that a

> saving doctrine is no sooner stated than it threatens to destroy. Miegge tells me that if I am not to be inhuman I must believe in God as Father; but I remember that fathers, though they sometimes welcome back the prodigal, sometimes cut him off with a shilling; that that, according to the theological version of the doctrine of *apartheid*, is what God has done to his black sons in Africa; that the S.S. man wore *"Gott mit uns"* upon the buckle of his belt. And standing across the end of the road of doctrine I see the gaunt shape of the Grand Inquisitor, ready for humanity's sake to burn out everything that makes us man.

We can only express our human condition by means of myth and metaphor. The trouble begins when we treat our metaphors as exclusive truths.

> For then we begin to surrender our conscience and our judgment to these creatures of our imagination; they grow; they soon bestride the world; they summon us in majestic terms to do their bidding; and all experience shows that no matter how carefully they may be formulated, with no matter how many qualifications to protect them against abuse, what they bid us to do is as often the prompting of our baser, as of our nobler nature. In this respect religious and political doctrines are at one. Since fathers can be angry, and since organisms can dispense with some of their members, to take those metaphors seriously is to give oneself general permission to harden one's heart, upon occasion, against one's fellows: and when men have been keen enough to do that, theologians and political theorists have never been wanting to prove, in terms of the metaphor, that they were justified. That, if anything, is writ large throughout the history of the race.
>
> How then, when we are under stress, can we avoid the path of doctrine? How can we be firm without fanaticism, and tolerant without weakness? Is there any other path...? I cannot enter here on that inquiry; but, as a suggestion, I seem to remember a story of Gautama which I cannot now place. It may be fictitious; but it will do. Some point of doctrine having been raised, one of his followers, being asked his opinion, simply smiled at which Gautama said: "You have begun to understand."

Man will continue to make machinery, material or intellectual, to help him, until he comes to know the SELF the Indian sages named. And even there he will have to grasp the idea and not the word.

LEAVES FROM A PARIS DIARY

[**Shri Baldoon Dhingra** considers some interesting questions raised by the invention of translating machines, and gives us a glimpse of Gabriel Marcel, the famous French thinker.—ED.]

I MUST CONFESS that when I heard about electronic computers — the machines that will be used for the translation of languages — I was not greatly amazed. But, when my friend Emile Delavenay, Chief of UNESCO's Publication Service, told me that these machines which are at present to be confined to the translation of natural sciences would, when perfected, be able to translate novels and poetry as well, I was alarmed. How could machines ever render delicate shades of meaning? They could at best merely translate literally without conveying anything of the spirit of the original. It is difficult enough, as it is, to capture the magic of a phrase and to render the subtleties of a rich and melodious sentence in another language. This requires a skilled and sensitive translator. But a machine would produce only a dull and stale paraphrase, a lifeless image. Of course, Delavenay holds that this new development, like the gramaphone, radio and television, will be of revolutionary importance in scientific and cultural relations between the peoples of the world. And what is more, Delavenay insists that mechanical translation will do much to preserve linguistic and cultural originality because it will encourage the use of less widely spoken tongues in a world in which two or three major languages would otherwise claim complete supremacy.

Emile Delavenay has discussed in his recently published book *La Machine à Traduire* the tremendous research that has been going on in this field since 1946 in England, America and Russia. How do these machines in fact work? According to Delavenay, in any statement symbols — diagrams or alphabets or aural signals — are used to exhibit the structure of ideations in the mind of the speaker. These ideations are given physical forms in language — as sound waves when we speak, as impressions on a magnetic tape when we record or as visible marks on paper when we write. It is by the processing of these physical signals of language that the words they record can be translated into another language by an electronic machine. Two numbers, physically represented by figures, can be added by a computing machine. With the translation machine, the operative principle, instead of summation, is the identification of the word fed in with another word stored in a "memory" — in this context an electronic dictionary.

Delavenay insists that our freedom in these and other matters is essentially limited. We have as much freedom as squirrels in a cage. Within that circumscribed field alone can we operate. Whereas, Delavenay says, in ordinary written communication, it is left to the reader to find in the context the clues he needs to decide upon one of the various possible meanings of a word, a machine must be supplied with univocal codes enabling it to make such decisions without human intervention. Through being constrained to establish precise connections between the meanings of ordinary linguistic usage and the mindless numerical operations of a machine, men will have opened the way to the more accurate use of ordinary language itself.

The advantages of these electronic computers to large private companies are obvious but whether it is advisable

that these machines should also one day tackle the spheres of drama and poetry is very questionable indeed. It does boil down to this: are not simple, prosaic translations better than none at all? If one can render Shakespeare into Basic English—and that with much labour—why not let these machines do that job rapidly and clearly? It is to discuss these and other questions that UNESCO is holding an International Conference on Information Processing in mid-June and a group of French firms, known as the Société pour le Développement du Traitement Numérique de l'Information, has been formed to arrange an exhibition to be held in the Grand Palais. Now the advantages of the machine would be that the translations of great classics will be available to the man in the street. Would the reputation of, say, Plato or Kalidasa or Goethe be more secure in the keeping of a little clan of worshippers than in the careless hands of a multitude? Will a man be remembered whose songs are sung for the few, are sung in a language that only the initiates understand and are given utterance in some secret penetralia and exotic odours, dim and curious lights and sounds subdued by mystery? These are questions one might well ask. We are all familiar with the words of Jesus and the Buddha on like subjects. Did not Gandhiji once say: "The supreme consideration is man. The machine should not tend to make atrophied the limbs of man"?

I have had many opportunities recently of meeting the great French philosopher, Gabriel Marcel. He has the distinction of being one of most versatile and brilliant writers of France. He is a poet, playwright, essayist, philosopher and musician. His audience is large, his devotees legion. Does his versatility presage a lack of lasting distinction in any field? Marie Madeleine Davy has described Gabriel Marcel as an itinerant philosopher — he journeys through many worlds and incarnates himself at all times. It is important to read what he, a Catholic philosopher, has to say about reincarnation. His essay *L'homme In Carne* is absolutely brilliant. A *résumé* would hardly do it justice. I asked Gabriel Marcel many questions — on his views about Oriental culture, on Indian thought and life, about human freedom. I found him especially interested not only in the subtle processes which precede action but action itself. Gabriel Marcel is vitally concerned with ideas and with moral qualities which affect them when at length they are translated into action. I believe he felt that in most things Indians are more interested in thought which precedes action and found many things they allowed to happen quite beyond him. For Gabriel Marcel men must not merely weigh and will but *do*.

BALDOON DHINGRA

ENDS AND SAYINGS

"——————ends of verse
And sayings of philosophers."
HUDIBRAS

In 1957 Professor Philip E. Jacob published his *Changing Values in College*, a study of the impact of college teaching on the sense of values of the American student. This book caused much discussion, and the Edward W. Hazen Foundation has published a booklet by Professor John E. Smith of Yale on *Value Convictions and Higher Education* which considers philosophically important issues, arising out of the previous book, concerning the nature of values, their interrelations and what centres of learning can do to inculcate a sense of lofty values without falling into the sin of indoctrination in a particular creed.

Professor Smith argues with some insistence that a descriptive treatment of values, now in favour with the social scientists, is not only inadequate but may even lead to scepticism about the reality and power of values. If value is identified simply with what people with this or that background happen to prefer, and explanations of these preferences are given solely in terms of background and social influences, the student may come to feel that values in fact are only patterns of conformity.

Professor Smith upholds the noble old idea that values imply both an individual with a purpose in life and a real power of choice and also an impersonal, real goodness or truth to which the choice tends, however imperfectly. He says:—

> The doctrine to be avoided is that values have only subjective validity just because valuation always takes place within the *human* context.... The good and the true make *universal* claims.

Hence:—

> Unless the critical question is raised concerning the criterion of the preference or choice and its *binding force* upon us, we are as far from the centre of value as we can be.

An important point in the study of values, Professor Smith brings out, is that there is a core of "dominant value" according to which all an individual's specific values are ordered. This dominant value shows the orientation of the person as a whole, his self. Tolerance as a social value, for instance, may be practised by a person with compassion as his dominant value or by one with self-interest as a dominant value.

> The character of the person [Professor Smith says] is not reached through a system of instruction alone, and it is most revealing that in considering the role of the instructor and what is called the college "personality," Professor Jacob is led to conclude that in many cases the most lasting influences upon student values came from the non-tangible, even "non-academic," factors in the educational situation.... There are depths of personality which the university cannot touch within the confines of regular academic routine; if these depths are to be influenced at all within the framework of higher education, it will be necessary for the university not only to pay more attention to the total atmosphere within which the student works but also to shift emphasis from the mass back to the individual.

Not specific instruction but the appeal of a university atmosphere and "the individual and personal magnetism of a sensitive teacher with strong value-commitments of his own" can serve to inspire a change in a student's "dominant value."

> The proper performance of his duty is bound to place a great but most necessary burden of self-consciousness upon the teacher.

Many readers will be in sympathy with these remarks from Professor Smith's "Conclusion":—

...disciplines such as literature, history and philosophy are more likely to influence students in holding normative value standards with tenacity and conviction. For unless the concern for special values is undergirded by a general respect for a type of life and conduct which can be called "good" in a normative sense, specific values have no power.

The basic prerequisite is a belief in the possibility of *choice governed by reasons and ideas* and a rejection of the thesis that all choice is merely a *reflection* of the environment in which the self *happens to be* placed.

The Indian Institute of World Culture celebrated Tagore Day on Tuesday, May 19th. Members of the Tagore Society of Bangalore participated, some of them, Shrimati Ratna Roy, Shri T. K. Chowdry and Shrimati Sunil Ghosh, rendering the poet's songs with deep feeling. They were able to convey effectively the joyous belief in a harmonious bond between human beings and Nature which runs through these songs.

Another evening was devoted to the memory of Shakespeare. On May 21st the Rev. I. L. Thomas gave a talk on the life of Shakespeare and drama in the Shakespearean era. He made an interesting point about the use of stage properties in those days by reading a passage which gave a list of various stage properties owned by a troupe of the Shakespearean age. Hence, he observed, it was not entirely correct to suppose that stage properties were not in use. Shakespeare, he concluded, had built in the hearts of the people of all ages a "life-long monument." Professor A. N. Moorthy Rao, who was in the chair, also said a few words.

Another anniversary, the three-hundredth of the great English composer, Henry Purcell, was celebrated the same week, on May 23rd. Purcell came of a musically gifted family and his first composition was the twelve Sonatas in three parts. They are based on Italian models and show great power and originality. Excerpts from the Sonatas and a few other compositions were played.

DARKNESS

Praise darkness whence all marvels emanate,
The child, the bird, the flower,
The acorn's darkness nurturing giant power.

Praise darkness wherein silence has its roots
Intangible and deep,
Pregnant with all the solaces of sleep.

Praise darkness, cradle of all mysteries
Of scent and hue and sound,
Darkness where God Himself is sought and found.

HERBERT BLUEN.

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

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